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Abstract
With increased energy demand and decreased fossil fuels usages, the penetration of
distributed generators (DGs) attracts more and more attention. Currently central-
ized control approaches can no longer meet real-time requirements for future power
system. A proper decentralized control strategy needs to be proposed in order to
enhance system voltage stability, reduce system power loss and increase operational
security. This thesis has three key contributions:
Firstly, a decentralized coordinated reactive power control strategy is proposed to
tackle voltage fluctuation issues due to the uncertainty of output of DG. Case study
shows results of coordinated control methods which can regulate the voltage level
effectively whilst also enlarging the total reactive power capability to reduce the
possibility of active power curtailment. Subsequently, the communication system
time-delay is considered when analyzing the impact of voltage regulation.
Secondly, a consensus distributed alternating direction multiplier method (ADMM)
algorithm is improved to solve the optimal power flow (OPF) problem. Both syn-
chronous and asynchronous algorithms are proposed to study the performance of
convergence rate. Four different strategies are proposed to mitigate the impact of
time-delay. Simulation results show that the optimization of reactive power alloca-
tion can minimize system power loss effectively and the proposed weighted autore-
gressive (AR) strategies can achieve an effective convergence result.
Thirdly, a neighbouring monitoring scheme based on the reputation rating is pro-
posed to detect and mitigate the potential false data injection attack. The simulation
results show that the predictive value can effectively replace the manipulated data.
The convergence results based on the predictive value can be very close to the results
of normal case without cyber attack.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis mainly addresses the issues of voltage rise and optimal power flow (OPF)
in power distribution system. Because current centralized control strategies cannot
effectively manage system efficiency caused by distributed generator(DG), innovative
decentralized voltage control method and alternating direction multiplier method
(ADMM) based optimization OPF algorithm combined with communication model
are designed to address the research challenges. In addition, the cyber attack analy-
sis in such distribution network is studied to test the performance on the convergence
results of ADMM. Communication system is a critical component in future smart
grid network due to the need of integrating renewable generators, distributed stor-
ages and electric vehicles. However, communication system may have a certain side
effect on the normal control operation and optimization results for the distribution
power system. This thesis will present communication time-delay model to both
decentralized voltage control strategy and ADMM-based optimization algorithm.
Subsequently, the cyber attack of communication system is also simulated to show
the performance of these algorithms.
1.1 Motivation
A complete electric power system is made up of power generation system, trans-
mission system, subtransmission system and distribution system [1]. Modern power
grid is the most complex artificial system and energy transmission network in the
1
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world. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the basic elements for a traditional power system.
A complex transmission network consists of transmission lines, transformers and
switching devices. The transmission system mainly interconnects the power gener-
ation facilities and various distribution load centers. In general, the generation and
transmission systems are referred to as bulk power systems. The voltage level in
transmission system always operates at the highest voltage levels (generally, 230 kV
or more) [2]. The subtransmission system and distribution system transfer the elec-
tricity to the terminal consumers. The subtransmission system mainly transfers the
power to large industrial consumers. The distribution system represents the final
stage in the transfer of electricity power to the individual consumers. The primary
distribution voltage is usually in the range of 4 kV to 34.5 kV and the secondary
distribution voltage is typically at 120 V and 220/240 V (Data is based on the
North American interconnected power system in [3]). The overall system consists of
multiple power supplies and multilayer transmission networks which provide a high
degree of structural redundancy to improve the stability of the power system.
Figure 1.1: The basic elements for power system [1]
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As the world enters a period of rapid development under the backdrop of ever-
expanding world economy, increased energy demand, improvement in reducing envi-
ronmental pollution, adjustment of energy structure and stringent requirements on
sustainable development are just several hotly debated subjects. The smart power
system, known as smart grid (SG), refers to a new generation of modern electrical
power system that aims to provide efficient, secure, reliable and high quality renew-
able energy using modern communications, sensor measurement, automatic control
and analysis decision technologies [4]. The renewable energy sources (RESs), such as
sunlight, wind, tides, plant growth and geothermal heat, will become progressively
more important as time goes on in future SG. The large penetration of DGs has been
encouraged in order to achieve the government’s goals related to the promotion of
a more sustainable development. In 2007, the United Kingdom Government agreed
with European Union’s overall goal of generating 20% of the European Union’s en-
ergy supply from renewable sources by 2020 and the allocated target of the United
Kingdom is 15% [5]. In 2009, the European Community has officially recognized
the requirement to promote the RES as a major resource in energy sector [6]. A
drastically increasing RESs are expected in upcoming years through the world.
Nevertheless, the unpredictable output of DGs to distribution network (DN) will
cause a series of technical challenges, such as voltage problem and power loss problem
[7]. Furthermore, traditional centralized control strategies may not control power
system effectively and also can not be done in real-time. Thus, it is necessary to
develop proper control techniques not only to maintain the system security and
stability, but also to reduce the economic loss in real-time. Controlling the real
and reactive power output by means of DGs implies that RES units can directly
participate to control the voltage level and optimize the system efficiency [8–10]. In
light of the requirement of new technologies and higher penetration of DGs, reactive
power control strategy has emerged to alleviate voltage rise and optimization issues.
An appropriate reactive power control method not only can deal with these problems
effectively, but also reduce the need of new assets and reinforcements from the
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network.
Many extensive studies have been carried out to develop efficient reactive power
control methods. Although numerous reactive power control strategies are report-
ed in the literature [11–21], few of them mention the communication time-delay
problem although the decentralized control operation contains a limited informa-
tion exchange during the system optimization. When the practical communication
delay is considered, some control strategies may not obtain the optimal target and
sometimes could not even get the effective result. For voltage stability issue, a
few coordinated control methods in [15–21] were proposed to maintain the voltage
level. However, these algorithms did not consider the impact of communication
time-delay on the operation of coordination algorithms. For economic loss problem,
a few papers [22–24] introduced synchronous communication time-delay system into
the decentralized ADMM algorithm, which was based on a master-slave strategy.
The proposed algorithms in these papers could still be treated as centralized control
approaches. Because the master could be considered as a control center which would
collect information from all other independent workers. Only when all the informa-
tion had been received by the master, the master would broadcast to other nodes
to proceed the next step. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the majority of
recent papers have not investigated this subject, particularly the fully decentralized
control strategy in distribution power system with communication time-delay.
1.2 Aims of Research
The aim of this thesis is to study the performance of the algorithms combined with
communication time-delay in distribution power system, including coordinated volt-
age control, optimization OPF problem, and cyber attack issues. More specifically,
the research has the following objectives:
• To analyze the performance of decentralized coordinated voltage control meth-
ods with the communication time-delay model.
• To develop the ADMM-based decentralized optimization algorithm that is
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applicable to solve the OPF problem. In addition, the communication time-delay
model is applied in this algorithm to analyze the performance on the convergence
results with both synchronous and asynchronous algorithm. Finally, four possible
strategies are also proposed to reduce the impact of the convergence results and
improve the algorithm efficiency.
• To analyze the possible impacts of cyber-attack on the control and optimization
algorithm, two possible cyber-attack models in decentralized reactive power control
strategies are summed up to analyze the vulnerability of the algorithms and two
targeted countermeasures are proposed to mitigate the impacts of attacks.
This research mainly studies local reactive power allocation, which can maintain
voltage level and optimize reactive power in order to minimize system power losses.
It is construed that my research tends to be centred around the optimization of
local reactive power absorption/injection of the distribution generator. Figure 1.2
shows that the local reactive power is a significant part of the distribution network
and has a close connection to my three research directions. Firstly, the voltage
level in distribution network can be adjusted by both reactive power and reactive
power, where the reactive power has the greatest influence on the voltage level.
Secondly, the effect of reactive power change on the system power loss is significant.
Therefore, it is necessary to optimize the distribution of local reactive power loss.
Finally, although distributed algorithm reduces the requirements for communication
systems, certain information exchange to complete the execution of the algorithm
still exists. Hence, the communication time-delay will become a problem that has
to be considered. And It is necessary to consider the impact of cyber-physical issue
on the algorithm.
1.3 Original Contributions
The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
• Given the little literature in the research of analyzing communication time-
delay in smart grid so far, this thesis links an imperfect communication system to a
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Figure 1.2: The basic connection of reactive power in distribution network
coordinated voltage control problem. The time-delay analysis is presented to show
the impact of communication time-delay to a coordinated voltage control strategy.
Simulation results show that, with time-delay, existing approaches cannot control
the voltage level as expected and thus may affect the system stability. The existing
control method should be modified to adapt to the applied time-delay introduced
by communication systems.
• ADMM algorithm [25] is improved to achieve the convergence results in the
OPF problem in power system. We propose to utilize improved iterative steps to
optimize the power loss which presents an efficient convergence result in this thesis.
The ADMM algorithm has been investigated for decades in power system, we focus
on the OPF formulation by a fully decentralized reactive power control approach
with time-delay model to optimize the results. The communication is based on the
information exchange between neighbouring nodes. The investigation of convergence
speed could provide a reference to design such kind of algorithm.
• Both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms considering communication
time-delay are proposed. Comparing with the results of synchronous no-delay algo-
rithm, the proposed asynchronous no-delay algorithm still has a better convergence
speed and optimization results during the same wall clock time whilst the asyn-
chronous algorithm has a larger time-delay tolerance during the iterative process.
Compared with other decentralized OPF algorithms, this work not only adds the
state-of-the-art communication delay model to the ADMM algorithm, but also ex-
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plores the performance of proposed synchronous and asynchronous algorithms with
time-delay in decentralized OPF problem. Furthermore, the simulation results prove
that the communication delay has a great influence on the results of decentralized
ADMM algorithm. With time-delay considered, the traditional decentralized algo-
rithm even can not converge normally.
• Due to large fluctuations arising from the results of the experiment of con-
vergence performance analysis with communication time-delay, we propose four d-
ifferent strategies, such as skipping strategy (SS), previous value strategy (PVS),
autoregressive (AR) strategy (ARS) and weighted autoregressive strategy (WARS),
to optimize the synchronous and asynchronous convergence results. The proposed
WARS can effectively improve the convergence results for both synchronous and
asynchronous algorithms and also reduce the fluctuation of the results significantly
in the synchronous optimization algorithm with 10% probability of time-delay.
• The simulation results on two cyber attack models are also demonstrated to
analyze the vulnerability of control algorithms. According to the simulation, the
proposed algorithms have some shortcomings when the cyber attack occurs. Both
cyber attacks can significantly influence the results compared with the no-attack
case. Neighbouring monitoring strategy (NMS) based on the predictive value is
proposed to mitigate the impact of cyber attacks of information exchange between
neighbouring nodes on the OPF algorithm and achieve an improved convergence
result.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of thesis is described as follows:
Chapter 2
This chapter first introduces some traditional voltage control methods and also
shows the basic principle of reactive power output adjustment of DGs. Moreover,
the optimization OPF problem is also summarized in traditional power system.
For OPF problem in decentralized algorithms, a modified consensus version of the
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ADMM is adopted to solve problem. Finally, information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) challenges for stochastic communication time-delay and cyber attacks
in electrical power system network are discussed.
Chapter 3
This chapter introduces the decentralized coordinated voltage control method by
using the reactive power output of DGs. Since the algorithm includes a certain
information exchange during the algorithm iteration, the simulation results with
time-delay are displayed to analyze the performance on this decentralized coordi-
nated voltage control method.
Chapter 4
This chapter proposes ADMM-based synchronous and asynchronous algorithms con-
sidering stochastic time-delay. Using the stochastic communication time-delay mod-
el, the convergence performance of both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms
is simulated. In addition, different strategies, for example, skipping strategy, previ-
ous value strategy, AR strategy and weighted AR strategy, are proposed to reduce
the fluctuation of the results and also improve the efficiency of convergence results
for both algorithms.
Chapter 5
This chapter studies two cyber attack models, time-delay model and false data in-
jection model, to test the stability of OPF algorithm. The performances of both
attack models are presented and simulations can effectively show the weak points of
current algorithms. According to the experimental results, we propose a neighbour-
ing monitoring strategy to mitigate the potential impact of cyber threats to improve
the vulnerability of the algorithm.
Chapter 6
This chapter draws the conclusions and also presents several new research directions
for future work.
Chapter 2
Background
The penetration of renewable energy source (RES) units and use of information
and communication technologies (ICT) will be integral parts in a new generation of
power system, also known as smart grid. A crucial role of RES units is that they can
mitigate the environment pollution, increase the energy diversity and reliable the
power system. However, there are two main challenges that need to be addressed
in real time, i.e., stability of the system voltage profile and optimization of the
power loss. Due to the installation of DGs in local buses and the uncertainty of
DG output, the local voltage level for each bus will become variable. Thus, it is
necessary to propose an effective control strategy to maintain the voltage level in
real-time. Another issue is to minimize the power loss in terms of the reactive power
capability of DGs. Due to the requirement of wireless communication in real-time,
it is necessary to apply the probabilities of time-delay to analyze the effects on
the performance of normal results. By integrating the power system with a cyber
system, it shows the significant cyber security challenges and makes the entire power
system more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Thus, it is desirable to analyze and protect
power system in advance or detect the cyber attacks and mitigate the possible cyber
threats.
In this chapter, Section 2.1 presents the reactive power voltage control techniques.
Traditional voltage control methods are shown in Section 2.1.1 and the reactive
power voltage control method is introduced in Section 2.1.2. A literature review of
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OPF algorithms is given in Section 2.2.1. Then the ADMM-based OPF algorithm
is discussed in Section 2.2.2. Finally, the stochastic communication time-delay and
cyber-physical attacks in smart grid are presented in Section 2.3.
2.1 Reactive Power Voltage Control Techniques
The voltage profiles of all nodes are controlled by absorption, production and flow of
reactive power at all levels in the power system. The unpredictable output of renew-
able energy sources can cause a series of technical challenges. The variable output of
renewable energy would need additional actions to balance the power system. The
larger flexibility may be required to accommodate the variability of the supply side
and the relationship to power generation levels and loads. Sometimes renewable
power can increase with load. But when load levels drop and renewable energy gen-
eration increases, additional measures may need to be taken to balance the power
system. The system operators need to ensure that they have sufficient resources to
accommodate significant increases or decreases of reactive power to maintain system
balance. Another challenge arises when renewable energy is available at low load
levels. One of the main challenges is voltage fluctuation that needs an appropriate
control method to stabilize the voltage. The voltage regulation approaches can be
classified into two categories: centralized control strategies and decentralized control
strategies.
2.1.1 Traditional Voltage Control Methods
In the past few decades, the traditional devices used for voltage regulation can be
divided into three categories:
a Tap changer in transformers, such as No Load Tap Changers (NLTP) and On
Load Tap Changers (OLTC).
b Sources of reactive power, such as shunt reactors, shunt capacitors and Distri-
bution Static Compensator (DSTATCOM) .
c Line reactance compensator, such as series capacitor.
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Tap Changer
A tap changer in transformers is a mechanism to change the voltage level by selecting
the different turns ratios. The transformer can achieve the different turns ratios by
setting a number of access points, known as taps, in one or more windings. It is
necessary to change the turns ratios to satisfy the requirement of voltage regulation
from the power system point of view. There are two types of tap changers, No Load
Tap Changers (NLTC) and On Load Tap Changers (OLTC).
The NLTC, also called off-circuit tap changer, requires to be de-energized before
the tap is changed. This tap changer can be used in several scenarios in which a
frequent tap changing requirement is not needed and the power transformer system
is accepted to be interrupted. It is often employed in low voltage transformer due
to the seasonal change, system expansion and load growth. Furthermore, the NLTC
is also employed in high voltage transformer in which the tap changer normally will
be set just once at the time of installation.
For many power transformer systems, a sudden interruption of a tap changing is
unacceptable. Hence, the OLTC, also called on-circuit tap changer, is installed to
control the voltage level. This kind of tap changer often utilizes the numerous tap
selector switches to regulate the voltage level under load. Fig. 2.1 presents the
basic structure of OLTC, which is suitable for applications requiring high changing
frequency. Fig. 2.1(a) shows when one tap selector switch A closes, other switches
will open. If another tap selector switch B is selected to change the voltage, it will be
turned on to short switch A. Then switch A will open and switch B has completed
the selection. Another type of tap changer is shown in Fig. 2.1(b). It commences
operation at left side with electronic devices. In moving to other tap at right side,
the operation can change the tap selector switch by controlling the power electronic
components when other switch is selected.
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Figure 2.1: The basic structure of on-load tap changer [1].
Series Capacitors
The series capacitor has been used to regulate the voltage level for distributed and
industrial feeder since the 1930s [26]. It can compensate the inductive reactance
of transmission line by connecting in series with the line conductors. Meanwhile,
the installation of series capacitor can reduce transfer reactance, increase maximum
transmission power and reduce effective reactive power loss. Although series capac-
itor usually is not utilized in regulating the voltage level directly, it can improve
voltage profile and balance the reactive power in the power system.
2.1.2 Reactive Power Voltage Control Method
The synchronous generators can produce or absorb reactive power depending on the
excitation. If the generators are overexcited, they can produce reactive power to
the grid. If the generators are underexcited, they can absorb the reactive power
from the grid. The capability of the active/reactive power is limited by the field
current, armature current and end-region heating limitation, the application for a
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distributed generator will be discussed in Section 3.2.2. The synchronous generators
provide the voltage control on the supply side. Hence, additional voltage control
methods are usually required to balance the voltage level on the demand side.
The compensating devices can be classified into two types: passive compensation
and active compensation. Shunt reactors, shunt capacitors and series capacitors
can be treated as the passive compensation. They are often fixed on the transmis-
sion and distribution system to contribute to voltage control by modifying network
characteristics. Synchronous condensers and SVC can be treated as the active com-
pensation. They can connect to the buses directly and compensate reactive power
automatically to regulate the voltage level. As sketched in Fig. 2.2, SVC which is
comprised of one or more banks of fixed or switched shunt reactors or capacitors,
can be installed in some special nodes in power system, unlike the generator only
can be adjusted the voltage level at the terminal node. However, SVC has a limited
overload capability and an expensive investigation.
These reactive power control strategies only concern with the planning of the reactive
power. Hence, there is a need to adopt a more efficient voltage control method in
order to regulate the voltage profile in smart grid with high penetration of DGs in
real-time. The voltage control by reactive power and allocation problem has been
researched extensively in the literature [27–32]. More recently, a group of researchers
have overcome the voltage fluctuation issues of distribution network with inverter-
based distributed generators. Compared with the preceding voltage control methods,
the inverter-based DG reactive power control has more advantages. First, it is more
effective. Second, it has superior real-time performance. Thirdly, it does not need
additional investigations.
Generally, the approaches of voltage regulation based on the apparent power capa-
bility of DG with inverter can be classified as follows: centralized control strategies
and decentralized control strategies [33–35]. Centralized control strategies can mon-
itor the status of all reactive power compensation equipments, perform a certain
load forecast, optimize reactive power allocation based on the forecast, determine
reactive
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Figure 2.2: One-line diagram of a typical SVC configuration with a thyristor con-
trolled reactor, a thyristor switched capacitor, a harmonic filter, a mechanically
switched capacitor and a mechanically switched reactor [3].
power injection/absorption for each device and send control signals to local reactive
power control equipment. However, there are two issues need to be discussed. First,
the process for such a large power system is too cumbersome that may induce a
large time-delay. Second, a certain forecasting error would be possible due to the
large time-delay and uncertainty of output power, which may result in the optimal
reactive power allocation being a bad accuracy of the solution.
To mitigate the effect of time-delay, decentralized control approaches were proposed
to optimize the voltage level which could reduce the time of the control process
dramatically. An autonomous decentralized control strategy was studied in [11] by
employing a multi-agent system. The cost of additional communication network will
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be lower compared with the requirement of information exchange in a centralized
strategy. In [36], a decentralized control method that considers the control priority
was proposed to adjust the reactive power output by changing the power factor of a
PV system. Using this control approach, each DG is independent from the others,
thus it may not deal with some special circumstances without any cooperation in
real time, e.g., DG out of service, greater demand load than usual or larger active
power output. If one DG is out of service, the other DGs will not help to improve
the voltage level of the node that has broken down. Reference [37] presented a
coordinated control strategy of DGs to improve the voltage fluctuation issues which
can adjust itself cooperatively to optimize the reactive power allocation. However,
these works did not consider the effect of time-delay on the performance of voltage
fluctuation in the distribution system.
Therefore, it is anticipated to propose a coordinated reactive power voltage control
strategy to realize real-time control in order to meet the uncertain output of DGs.
Meanwhile, the analysis of communication time-delay system on the performance of
control method will be an important part for the study of control strategy.
2.2 ADMM Based OPF Problem of Reactive Pow-
er Control
When electricity power is transmitted across the transmission and distribution sys-
tem, a fraction of the energy will be dissipated due to the resistance which is de-
pendent on the conductor, current and length of the line. As the power loss is a
quadratic function of the current (I2R) which is subject to the power flow, there
is a largest loss when the peak load demand occurs in the distribution network. In
addition, the distribution transformers contribute to power losses in the form of a)
heat loss within the iron core, and b) load loss represented by the current flowing
through the windings.
The resistance and reactance of the conductors will be a significant part of the
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system power loss calculation for underground cables and overhead line in alternating
current system. Compared with the conductor loss, sheath loss and dielectric loss
can be neglected since they are relatively too small. The reactive power flow (the
reactive current flow solely in reaction to the circuit) transmits no ’real’ power to the
load which can result in an additional heating loss in the transmission line. When
the reactive current increases, the reactive power will increase and the power factor
will decrease (Power factor means the ratio of active power to apparent power).
The power loss will be higher due to the low power factor in the transmission and
distribution networks. Hence, the additional reactive power compensation methods
can help to compensate for the reactive power flow through the power system. In
other words, reactive power can stabilize the system voltage level. If the reactive
power decreases, the total system power loss will also be reduced.
The future smart grid will become more and more granular because of the high
penetration of DGs. It can reduce the amount of the transfer of apparent power
from remote generation via transmission and distribution networks if DGs connect
to the buses directly. And the total power loss of the system will also be decreased.
In order to analyze the basic characteristic of voltage level and power loss in a large
complex power system, detailed analysis of power flow needs to be studied in order to
demonstrate the performance of optimization results in a distributed power system.
2.2.1 Overview of OPF Problem
In this subsection, the power flow analysis will be described to study the performance
of the power system.
Bus Classification
There are four quantities associated with each bus: active power, reactive power,
voltage magnitude and voltage angle. All buses can be classified as follows:
• PV bus: Active power and voltage magnitude are fixed. Meanwhile, the re-
active power output is limited by the characteristics of the individual devices,
such as generators, synchronous condensers and SVC.
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Table 2.1: Classification of Buses
P Q V θ
PV bus known known unknown unknown
PQ bus known unknown known unknown
Slark bus unknown unknown known known
Device bus unknown unknown unknown unknown
• PQ bus: Active power and reactive power are fixed. Generally, loads are as-
sumed to be constant. When the tap changer operation of distribution trans-
former can be neglected, active power and reactive power are set as functions
of voltage.
• Slack bus: It is also known as the reference bus. The voltage magnitude and
phase angle are fixed. Since the power loss in the power system is unknown in
advance, the slack bus can be utilized to balance the active power and reactive
power to increase/decrease the power loss in the system.
• Device bus: These buses are special boundary conditions associated with elec-
tronic equipments, for example, HVDC converters.
In general, the slack bus injects or absorbs the active power and reactive power which
is crucial to the power flow issue since it can account for transmission line losses.
And it is the only bus to be known as the reference phase angle. The summary can
be found in Table 2.1.
Power Flow Analysis
As the balanced operation of power system is considered only, each element will
be modelled in the light of its single-phase equivalent. The relationships between
voltages and currents of nodes can be written as either loop equations or node
equations. Since the number of independent loop equations is larger than the number
of independent node equations, it is obvious that the node equations will be adopted
in this chapter.
The equations in the light of node admittance matrix can be found as follows:
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
I¯1
I¯2
· · ·
I¯n
 =

Y11 Y12 · · · Y1n
Y21 Y22 · · · Y2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
Yn1 Yn2 · · · Ynn


V¯1
V¯2
· · ·
V¯N
 (2.1)
where
n is the number of total nodes.
I¯i is the phasor current flowing to the network at node i.
V¯i is the phasor voltage to the ground at node i.
Yii is the self admittance of node i and also means the total admittances termi-
nating at node i.
Yij is the admittance between node i and node j and also means the negative of
the sum of total admittances between node i and node j.
The form of nonlinear loads and other devices connecting to the nodes is represented
as the node current. Meanwhile, constant linear loads will be included in the node
admittance matrix. The general observations regarding to the node admittance
matrix can be found as follows:
1. It is a sparse matrix and the degree of sparsity depends on the size of the
network.
2. It is singular if there are no shunt branches to the ground.
3. It has a weak diagonal dominance, for example, |Yii| ≥
∑
i 6=j
|Yij|.
4. It is symmetrical if there are no phase-shifting transformers.
Equation 2.1 will be linear if the injected phasor current is known. However, the
injected phasor current is not known for most nodes in the network in practice.
The phasor current at any node i is determined by active power, reactive power
and phasor voltage. It is clear that the boundary conditions of different types of
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nodes make the issue nonlinear. Hence the power flow analysis needs to be addressed
iteratively using methods such as Gauss-Seidel method or Newton-Raphson method.
The principles of the application are brief in [1]. The comprehensive reviews of
numerical methods of power flow calculation can be found in [38,39]
Comparison of the Power Flow Calculation Methods
The Gauss-Seidel method, also known as the Liebmann method or the method of
successive displacement, is the oldest way to solve the power flow problem in power
system [40]. It is a simple and reliable way usually with a tolerant of poor voltage
and reactive power conditions. Meanwhile, it has a relatively low requirement of
computer memory. However, when the power system is large, the calculation time
of power flow will increase significantly. In addition, when the power system is
stressed in terms of the high levels of active power transmission, the Gauss-Seidel
method often has a slow convergence speed and presents a bad convergence result.
The Newton-Raphson method, named after Isaac Newton and Joseph Raphson, is
an efficient way to solve the power flow problem with a good convergence rate [41].
In addition, the calculation time shows a linear increase with the increased size
of power system. However, this method requires a very good initial estimate to
obtain a final globally optimal result, a poor initial estimate can contribute to the
non-convergence of the method. If the voltage solution is near to the true solution,
the convergence rate will be very quick and the result will be close to the globally
optimal result. Therefore, it is suitable for particular applications that require very
accurate solutions.
The Fast Decoupled Load Flow (FDLF) method is a variation form of Newton-
Raphson method that utilizes the approximate decoupling of active and reactive
power flows in well-dehaved power network. In addition, the FDLF method fixes
the Jacobian matrix during the iterations in order to reduce the recalculated and
refactorized in every iteration. Although the number of iterations will have a certain
increase, the calculation process for each iteration will be reduced dramatically.
And the requirement of computer memory will be low compared with requirement
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of the Newton-Raphson method. The convergence rate of FDLF method can also
be improved to linear. Furthermore, the FDLF method is less sensitive to the
initial estimate conditions than the Newton-Raphson method. However, when the
particular system conditions, such as large angles across lines and particular control
devices, affect the active and reactive power flow significantly, the Newton-Raphson
method with updated Jacobian matrix may be more suitable for adoption.
In the previous discussion, these methods, based on the off-line centralized optimal
strategy, require a single control center to have a fully accurate observation of the
power system network structure in advance. Hence, such a power system needs a
bi-direction information exchange between control center and nodes. The optimiza-
tion process requires a highly reliable communication process. When some nodes’
information is not delivered promptly during the iteration, the entire system may
not achieve the iterative result. Meanwhile, the information exchange has a large
computation and communication delay which may prevent the objective of real-time
optimization. The development of smart grid requires ICT architecture to maximise
the system’s potential. It is clear that ICT will become an integral part in the next
generation of power system, and the decentralized optimization strategy in pow-
er system will require the ICT to connect all independent nodes to implement the
real-time optimization during the system operation. Furthermore, the uncertain-
ty output power of penetrating DGs also requires the power system to realize the
autonomous control in real-time. It is significant to migrate control strategy from
a traditional centralized approach to a decentralized approach. As a result, it is
crucial to develop algorithms that can not only capture the complexity of big data,
but also process huge data in a parallelized or fully decentralized way.
2.2.2 ADMM Based OPF Problem
A simple but powerful iterative algorithm, the alternating direction method of mul-
tipliers (ADMM), is well suited to distributed convex optimization problem and
in particular to large-scale power system due to the robust and fast convergence
results both in theory and practice [42]. Before the current large-scale distributed
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computing system was proposed, the ADMM has already been developed. It utilizes
a decomposition coordination procedure to separate the problem into local subprob-
lems to find a global solution. It is worth emphasizing that the ADMM algorithm
is not a new algorithm, but try to blend the advantages of augmented Lagrangian
method and dual decomposition method for constrained optimization [43,44]. This
algorithm can be extended to solve many big data problems and provide easy im-
plementation for many applications.
The algorithm of ADMM
ADMM is a blend algorithm that is trying to decompose the global problem into
subproblems. The global problem can be written as follows:
minimize f(x) + g(x) (2.2a)
subject to Ax+Bz = c. (2.2b)
where A ∈ Rp×n, B ∈ Rp×m and c ∈ Rp. x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rm are the variables.
We assume that function f and g are convex. The only difference from the general
linear problem is that the objective function (2.2a) has two independent variables
which are x and z. The optimal value of the problem in (2.2) can be written as:
p = inf{f(x) + g(x)|Ax+Bz = c}. (2.3)
Then the augmented Lagrangian formula can be given by
L(x, z, y) = f(x) + g(x) + yT (Ax+Bz − c) + ρ
2
‖Ax+Bz − c‖22 . (2.4)
where y is the Lagrangian multiplier (dual variable) and ρ is the penalty factor.
Then the ADMM recursive algorithm for kth iterative step can be written as follows
xk+1 := arg min
x
Lρ(x, zk, yk) (2.5a)
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zk+1 := arg min
z
Lρ(xk+1, z, yk) (2.5b)
yk+1 := yk + ρ(Axk+1 +Bzk+1 − c). (2.5c)
where ρ > 0. The algorithm contains three steps: x-minimization step (2.5a), z-
minimization step (2.5b) and dual variable update step (2.5c).
As in the method of multipliers, the dual variable update uses a step size equal to
the penalty factor ρ [45]. However, the augmented Lagrangian is minimized together
with two primal variables. The method of multipliers can be defined as follows
(xk+1, zk+1) := arg min
x,z
Lρ(x, z, yk) (2.6a)
yk+1 := yk + ρ(Axk+1 +Bzk+1 − c). (2.6b)
where the two variables x and z need to be minimized jointly. On the contrary, the
ADMM method can update x and z in a sequential way which means the alternating
direction term. In other words, the ADMM can be treated as a special form of
method of multipliers that can minimize the x and z separately instead of the joint
minimization. When the global problem can be separable, the minimization of x
and z can be also divided into two steps.
Moreover, the ADMM can be modified slightly to achieve a better and more conve-
nient version, scaled ADMM. The expression of ADMM can be modified as
xk+1 := arg min
x
(f(x) +
ρ
2
∥∥Ax+Bzk − c+ uk∥∥2
2
) (2.7a)
zk+1 := arg min
z
(g(z) +
ρ
2
∥∥Axk+1 +Bz − c+ uk∥∥2
2
) (2.7b)
yk+1 := yk + Axk+1 +Bzk+1 − c. (2.7c)
where u = 1
ρ
y is the scaled dual variable. We define the residual of the kth iteration
as rk = Axk +Bzk − c, then we have
uk = u0 +
k∑
i=1
ri. (2.8)
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where uk is the sum of the residuals.
Both two forms are clearly equivalent, but the scaled form (2.7) is usually shorter
than the unscaled form (2.5). The unscaled form can be used when the role of the
dual variable need to be emphasized.
The convergence of ADMM
There are many literatures that discuss about the convergence issue for ADMM [46].
Here a basic but still general result will be studied for general applications. We
propose two assumptions to the convergence issue for ADMM.
Assumption 1. The real value function f(x): Rn → R∪{+∞} and function g(z):
Rm → R ∪ {+∞} are convex, closed and proper.
Explicitly, this assumption can be shown compactly using the epigraph of a function
[47]. Rn → R is the sets of points lying on or above its graph. And the function
f satisfies the assumption 1 if and only if its epigraph epif is a closed non-empty
convex set.
epif = {(x, µ) : x ∈ Rn, µ ∈ R, |f(x) ≤ µ} (2.8)
The assumption 1 indicates that the subproblems f(x) and g(z) can be solved to
obtain the minimizations by augmented Lagrangian in (2.5a) and (2.5b)(without
further assumptions on A and B). It is important to note that assumption 1 permits
function f(x) and g(z) to be nondifferentiable and the value of function can be +∞.
We assume that the function f(x) is the indicator function of a closed non-empty
convex set C, for example.
x =
0 x ∈ C+∞ x * C (2.9)
Hence, the x minimization step in (2.5a) will involve solving a quadratic program-
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ming under several constraints within a valid domain C for function f(x).
Assumption 2. The unaugmented Lagrangian function L0 has a saddle point.
This assumption 2 can be presented that there is not a necessary unique solution
(x∗, z∗, y∗), which has the form for all x, y, z.
L0(x
∗, z∗, y) ≤ L0(x∗, z∗, y∗) ≤ L0(x, z, y∗). (2.10)
For any saddle point x∗, z∗, y∗ with assumption 1, L0(x∗, z∗, y∗) is +∞. Therefore,
it can be found that x∗, z∗ are the solution for equation (2.4). Then Ax∗ +Bz∗ = c
and f(x∗) ≤ ∞, f(z∗) ≤ ∞. Meanwhile, y∗ is a dual optimal point which implies
that the optimal results of the dual problem and primal problem are equal. Note
that A,B and c have no additional assumption under assumption 1, except under
assumption 2. In addition, neither A nor B is needed to be full rank.
Under assumption 1 and 2, the iterative results of ADMM should satisfy as follows
1. Objective convergence: f(xk) + g(zk)→ p for k →∞. It means that the ob-
jective function of the iterative algorithm ia approaching the optimal solution.
2. Residual convergence: rk → 0 for k → ∞. It means that the iterative algo-
rithm is feasible.
3. Dual variable convergence: yk → y∗ for k → ∞. It means that y∗ is a dual
optimal parameter.
The proof of the residual convergence and objective convergence results can be found
in [48]. Note that we do not need xk and zk ( k → ∞) converge to the optimal
points.
ADMM-based distributed optimization
Here we present a general consensus version of ADMM algorithm to solve a dis-
tributed optimization problem. Consensus issues with ADMM can be found since
the 1980s [49]. First of all, we consider a global function with a global variable.
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Then the global objective function and variable can be split into N sub-objective
functions and constraints.
minimize f(z) =
N∑
i=1
fi(z). (2.11)
where z ∈ Rn and fi : Rn → R ∪ {+∞} are convex. fi(z) is the ith sub-objective
function. The goal of the global function is to solve the problem in a distributed
way that each sub-objective function can be solved by its own parameter.
Assume that we have sub-objective functions f1(x1), · · · , fn(xn) with their own local
variables xi ∈ Rn, i = 1, ..., n. Each local variable is made up of a selected compo-
nents of the global variable z ∈ Rn, which means each local variable is associated
with some global variables z(i,j). Then the consensus between the local variables
and global variables can be written as
xi = z(i,j), i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m. (2.12)
If z(i,j) is equal to zi, then each local variable xi is just a copy of global variable which
means that the consensus decrease to global variable consensus, xi = zi. General
consensus optimization form implies that each local variable can have a few number
of global variables. In Fig. 2.3, the left side is the local independent objective
functions with local variables and the right side is the global variables. Fig. 2.3
shows that each local objective function may be associated with a few number of
global variables. In this case, there are three sub-objective functions and four global
variables. Each local function f1, f2, f3 is associated with 4, 2, 3 global variables,
respectively. Each edge implies a consensus constraint between a local variables
component and a global variable.
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Figure 2.3: The general consensus optimization form.
Assume zi be the global variable of what the local variable xi should be. Then the
general consensus problem with consensus constraint can be given as
minimize f(z) =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi) (2.13a)
subject to xi − zi = 0, i = 1, ..., n. (2.13b)
Then the augmented Lagrangian for equation (2.13) can be written as follows:
Lρ(x, z, y) =
N∑
i
(fi(xi) + y
T
i (xi − zi) + ρ2 ‖xi − zi‖22 . (2.14)
Then the improved ADMM recursive algorithm of node i derived from (2.14) for kth
iterative step can be given as:
xk+1i := arg min
xi
(fi(xi) + y
kT
i xi +
ρ
2
∥∥xi − zki ∥∥22) (2.15a)
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zk+1 := arg min
x
(
m∑
i=1
(−ykTi z +
ρ
2
∥∥xk+1i − zi∥∥22) (2.15b)
yk+1i := y
k
i + ρ(x
k+1
i − zk+1i ). (2.15c)
where the update of xi and yi can be achieved independently in parallel for each
node i with local constraints. Because the global objective function can be totally
separable, then the update of zi can be decoupled only by the associated global
variables.
zk+1i =
m∗∑
i=1
(xk+1
(i,j)
+ 1
ρ
yk+1
(i,j)
)
m∗ .
(2.16)
where m∗ is the total number of global variables associated to node i. x(i,j) and y(i,j)
are the sets of local variables associated to global variable zi. x
k+1
(i,j) +
1
ρ
yk+1(i,j) is the
sum of all terms associated to global variable zi. When each local variable xi is just
a copy of global variable zi and the same type of argument is applied into the global
consensus case, a simple form of z-update can be written as:
zk+1i = x
k+1
i +
1
ρ
yi. (2.17)
In other words, the update of z is the local average value rather than the global
average value which could reduce the cost of communication among all independent
nodes in a large system. We have discussed ADMM and demonstrated its appli-
cability to distributed convex optimization problem in analysis of modern massive
datasets. In such ADMM, the based operations are intend to solve several small
convex optimization problems, e.g., a simple quadratic formula. When a very large
model problem is required to solve, the ADMM can decrease the global problem to
a number of small subproblems. These subproblems can be treated as a coordinated
decentralized algorithm to collaborate to solve a large global problem rather than a
centralized algorithm. This general form of consensus optimization provides a fully
decentralized way to solve a distributed OPF problem in power system.
As can be seen from the ADMM algorithm, there still are certain communications
between neighbouring nodes. When time-delay is considered in the ADMM algorith-
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m, the synchronization will become a critical problem. Although the synchronization
of all nodes enables the algorithm to be effectively controlled, the communication
time delay in a synchronous algorithm will be limited due to the slowest nodes
communication transmission. A few papers [22–24] have introduced synchronous
communication time-delay system into the decentralized ADMM algorithm, which
was based on a master-slave strategy. The proposed algorithms in these papers
could still be treated as centralized control approaches. Only when all the informa-
tion was received by the master, the master would broadcast other nodes to proceed
the next step. To analyze the influence of the communication time-delay model on
the performance of the iterative results, we will primarily a stochastic end-to-end
time-delay model.
2.3 ICT Challenges in the Smart Grid
The next generation of power system has to be rebuilt due to the need of efficien-
cy, flexibility of energy requirement, reliability of power delivery and security of
network. In order to manage the loads and demand response system, it should be
addressed by collecting and analyzing the information in real time. Therefore, a
new emerging concept of smart grid, a complex system with energy, power, senso-
ry, communication, computing and control, is proposed which can utilize the ICT
infrastructure to maximise the system potential. One of the main issues to realize
the real-time control is time-delay problem. It is a common phenomenon in engi-
neering control and optimization system. The effect of time-delay on the stability
of control system has been an important subject of many researches. It is necessary
to propose effective strategies to eliminate or minimize the unwanted effects for the
control approaches.
2.3.1 Stochastic End-to-end Time-delay
The components of end-to-end delay
During recent decades, the automatic control system has contributed to many prob-
lems in the world. It is clear that the investigation of time-delay is a great importance
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to evaluate the performance of control strategies. The measurement of end-to-end
time-delay offers an opportunity to learn about the underlying property of the topol-
ogy and traffic pattern. Several literatures report the end-to-end time-delay mea-
surement which is based on round-trip time [50–52]. However, these measurements
methods do not consider the one-way delay measurements. The end-to-end delay
D, a probe-packet over a fixed internet with several routers, can mainly be classified
as four components: processing delay Dp, queueing delay Dq, transmission delay Dt
and propagation delay Dprop.
Processing delay Dp: is the time that the router processes a packet header at each
node and prepare to transmit the packet. It is a key component in a network delay
and can check for bit errors and determine output link. This delay is determined by
the complexity of protocol stack, the available computational ability and link driver.
In the past, it is always ignored since the delay is often on the order of 10−6 seconds
or less. However, in some cases, the processing delay can be large when the router
operate a complex encryption algorithms. It can be viewed as a stochastic random
value because the probe-packet is not always the same size in terms of the various
requirements of the information exchange. Therefore, this delay can be divided into
two components: a deterministic delay Dpd and a stochastic delay Dps.
Queueing delay Dq: is the time that packet spends waiting in a queue at the
buffer of router until it can be executed before transmission. The queueing delay is
highly dependent on intensity and nature of traffic arriving at queue. It is typically
stochastic in nature in terms of the interference of the probe-packet with other
packets on the path. The basic queueing model is presented in Fig. 2.4.
Figure 2.4: The basic queueing model.
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A queueing delay model can be characterized by the arrival process of packets, the
behaviour of packets, the waiting room, the service times, the service discipline and
the service capacity. Kendall’s notation is the standard system which is utilized
to introduce a queueing model. It is a three-factor code A/B/C which is proposed
in 1953 [53]. A specifies the inter-arrival time probability density, B specifies the
service time probability density and C specifies the number of servers. For example,
M/M/1, M/M/c, M/G/1, G/M/1 and M/D/1. M means the exponential probability
density (M is also for Markov), D means all packets have the same value (D stands for
deterministic) and G means the general probability density (arbitrary probability
density). In a general model, packets arrive one by one and all the packets are
permitted to queueing buffer, the buffer size is enough for all the arriving packets
and there are no priority rules and the packets are served in order of arrival.
Transmission delay Dt: is the time (also known as store-and-forward delay) that
an entire packet is sent out from first bit to last bit into a wire. In other words, the
delay is mainly caused by the data rate and capability of the communication link.
It is a function of the packet size and has nothing to do with the distance between
two routers. This delay can be given by the following formula:
Dt =
L
R
. (2.18)
where L is the packet size (all of the packet bits) and R is the rate of link transmis-
sion. Since this delay is typically on the order of 10−6 seconds to 10−3 seconds, it
can be treated as a same value for each probe-packet.
Propagation delay Dprop: is the time that takes for the head of the signal to
propagate from the source to the destination at the propagation speed of the link.
The time depends on the physical medium of the link. This delay can be computed
as:
Dprop =
d
s
. (2.19)
where d is the distance between source and destination, s is the propagation speed
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of the specific medium. It can be negligible for two routers on the same local area
network and significant for two geostationary satellites.
From a measurement point of view, the end-to-end delay over a fixed path consists
of two categories: the deterministic (constant) delay Dd and the stochastic delay
Ds. Fig. 2.5 shows the histogram of a typical end-to-end communication delay on
a link from Amsterdam to London.
Figure 2.5: The typical delay histogram with the separation into deterministic and
stochastic delay [54].
Then we have the description of delay from a measurement point of view as [55]
Dd = Dpd +Dt +Dprop (2.20a)
Ds = Dps +Dq. (2.20b)
The formula (2.20a) presents that the deterministic delay Dd is mainly caused by
physical delay, the time between time-stamp generation, the effective start of trans-
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mission and the bandwidth of the link. The formula (2.20b) presents that the
stochastic delay Ds adds the contributions by the interfering internet traffic (also
known as the queueing delay) and the random part of processing delay.
The stochastic analysis of end-to-end delay
The independent sum of delay consists of the minimum deterministic delay, the
internet traffic delay and router processing delay. The router processing delay which
includes the minimum deterministic delay ϕd(t) can be approximated as a Gaussian
density. An extensive research [56] assesses the distributions of on-periods and off-
periods for internet traffic. There are three proposed parametric models for the
stochastic delay Ds caused by the queueing delay which are the exponential model,
the Weibull model and the Pareto model.
The exponential density can be obtained by one alternating renewal process with
exponential on-periods [56]. The on-period correspond to the periods where the
queueing delay has a closure period. This density can be given as
ϕexp(t) = λe
−λt, t ≥ 0. (2.21)
where λ−1 is the mean length of the on-period. Then the end-to-end delay can be
written as
ϕ(t) = pϕd(t) + λ(1− p)
∫ t
−∞ e
−λ(t−s)ϕd(s)ds. (2.22)
We assume that the mean µ and standard deviation σ in Gaussian density is known.
λ and p can be obtained by the method of maximum likelihood.
When the random time-delay is applied into the real-time research problems, it
becomes necessary that the effects of time-delay on the performance of different
algorithms are analyzed. Therefore, in this thesis, all the real-time control algorithm
will analyze the effects of time-delay and propose an appropriate way to mitigate
the effects of time-delay.
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2.3.2 Cyber-physical Attack Problem
Time-delay occurs in a wide variety of artificial control system which can affect the
stability of the system and reduce system performance. Power system is one of
the control systems that is sensitive to the time-delay. Future smart grids will rely
mainly on computers and communication systems, which make this type of network
vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. Although electricity supply generation and
consumption demand develop rapidly, the underlying power infrastructures have not
been updated in unison. It is necessary to observe vast deployment of sensors and
actuators on all levels of electrical power system. Research on the attack methods
of sensitive infrastructure industrial control systems, the development of counter-
measures and security control protocols, has attracted the attention of academia,
industry and government. Cyber-physical (CP) system consists of communication,
computation, and physical systems and processes. CP security becomes one of the
most important issues for a complex network. According to the information and
computation resources in the smart grid, malicious attackers can utilize the vulner-
abilities of the network to conceive attack plan to endanger the normal operation
of the grid. In the meantime, existing investigations have already shown several
disastrous consequences which are unprepared by the government, industry and the
public [57,58]. Therefore, it is imperative to assess the vulnerability against the CP
attacks and emergency response of critical power infrastructure for a comprehensive
defence plan.
2.3.2.1 Cyber-physical Perspective of Smart Grid
The innovative technologies have transformed the traditional power system to smart
grid in several areas, such as distributed energy resources, phasor measurement unit
and advanced metering infrastructure system. In addition, the increased energy s-
torages and electrical vehicles are changing the current power system. The National
Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) introduces an overview of smart grid
architecture in Fig. 2.6 which contains generation, transmission, distribution, oper-
ation, electricity markets, service providers and customers [59]. The communication
and computation systems have established cyber infrastructures that are interwo-
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ven with the physical system. Based on the measurements, the system operator
determines the optimal control strategy and issues control command to execute the
actuators cooperatively in the physical system. Sensor measurements are handled by
centralized and decentralized equipments deployed at different levels and locations.
In traditional power system, system operations are based on the energy management
system located in control center. The recent installation of intelligent devices and
programmable logical circuits have enhanced the utilization of distributed compu-
tation to increase the efficiency and flexibility. The smart grid is introducing new
communication standards to accommodate the integration of renewable energy and
phase measurement units (PMUs). PMUs measure the electrical waves on a power
grid using a common time source for synchronization. In order to increase the effi-
ciency and decrease the investment, smart grid is increasingly dependent on public
communication infrastructure. Bi-direction communication between providers and
customers is also widely established through the advanced metering infrastructure.
Therefore, the security challenges in smart grid are on the rise in both cyber and
physical areas [60].
Next, we will briefly talk about the advantages and disadvantages of physical security
and cyber security and emphasize the importance of CP security in smart grid. The
general structure of cyber-physical system can be found in Fig. 2.7.
1. Physical security: The physical security can be protected by evaluating e-
mergencies. Contingency analysis, including failures, interruptions and planned
outages, could ensure the survivability of the power system with minimum dis-
ruptions. However, an emerging interconnected power system poses a challenge
to physical security issues. The increasing size of power system will signifi-
cantly increase the complexity and cost of contingency analysis which makes
it difficult to implement contingency analysis as a whole. Without adequate
coordination, the remediation in multiple locations may compete with each
other rather than collaborate with each other which can also lead to deteriora-
tion of cascading failures or blackouts [61]. In the meantime, most equipments
and system designs do not have enough security features to prevent bad events
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from cyberspace. Hence, lack of adequate protection against coordinated cy-
ber attacks can be catastrophic. It is necessary to design an intelligent and
automatic system to increase system security and reliability against the cyber
attack in smart grid. The traditional power system security deserves a deep
study in the coming era of next generation of power system.
Figure 2.6: The overview of smart grid infrastructure based on the NIST framework
[59].
2. Cyber security: Cyber security has been identified as an important part of
smart grid development [62]. The deployment of Intrusion Detection System-
s (IDSs) and firewalls could defend control center and field devices against
external intrusion. The safety protocol can also protect the communication
system among control center, substations and field devices. Furthermore, A-
MI and PMU system could obtain secure and reliable communication from
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secure wireless communication. However, cyber security is also required to
accommodate physical properties of power system. Meanwhile, real-time data
flow between neighbouring nodes in smart grid poses tremendous data chal-
lenges to network security and further affects power flow calculation of the
system [63]. Consequently, it is necessary to add the physical aspects into the
cyber security analysis of smart grid.
Figure 2.7: The general structure of CP system in smart grid [59].
3. CP security: A secure smart grid depends on comprehensive security, which
combines the benefits of physical and cyber security analysis in every possible
events. It is obvious that the interdependence and interoperability between
cyber space and physical space need to be considered to reduce the risk of
combined CP attack. The system operators should be aware of the potential
risk destroyed by the attacker and propose appropriate ways to mitigate the
impact of network attacks. During the security analysis, the vulnerabilities
are general revealed by attackers having feasible resources. The investigations
of all possible attack events can help to figure out the potential vulnerabilities
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of the power system. And these investigations can be used directly to solve the
possible CP security problems and enhance the security of the current power
system.
2.3.2.2 Cyber-physical Attacks in Smart Grid
This thesis mainly discusses CP security in a smart grid. Both cyber attack and
physical attack can pose varying degrees of threat to the security of the power
system, the research on the integration of both CP attacks has recently become
a popular research direction. There are many reports of cyber intrusions, hack-
ing, unauthorized operations and malicious attacks on the electrical power system,
the types of CP attack can be divided into generation system attack, transmission
system attack, distribution system attack and electricity market attack.
The generation system widely uses the automatic generation control (AGC) system
to adjust the power output of multiple generators at different power plants. Load-
frequency control (LFC) and Economic dispatch (ED) are two major functions of
the AGC system [64]. ED does not affect the control system directly and LFC is
more important to be investigated to avoid possible generator damage. The Aurora
attack model, focused on the power generation system and can destroy physical
components by a cyber attack, was tested to investigate the vulnerability of the
primary controller of AGC system in [65]. The simulation results showed that the
attack can eventually destroy the generator completely. A similar CP attack with
incomplete information of power system was discussed in [66]. The vulnerability
of the secondary controller has also demonstrated the potential effects on system
stability. There are four general manipulations on the input of secondary controller,
there are scaling, ramping, pulse and random attack [67]. Furthermore, the malicious
control signal from LFC can lead to inter-area power swing which causes power
shortages or outages [68].
The transmission system mainly delivers electrical power across long distance through
transmission lines. There are many investigations on cyber-physical attacks for pow-
er transmission grids. The earliest research for a transmission grid is the interdiction
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attack which means the tripping of generators, lines, transformers and substations
in the transmission system. Reference [69] utilizes game theory to defend electrical
power systems against interdiction attack. A mixed-integer bilevel programming
model is presented to solve the disruptive threat problem [70]. In addition, multiple
concurrent tripping has been investigated to show the risk of blackout [71,72]. Both
sequential schemes have been used by considering different attack levels and various
vulnerabilities. A complex network based attack is another type of attack which u-
tilizes the interdiction as the means of attack. The attacker can only use topological
and structural information to identify the vulnerabilities of the transmission grid.
Both the topological model [73] and the hybrid model [74] have analyzed the risk of
cascaded attacks. The transmission substations have multiple measurement, control
and communication facilities. A substation attacks can often lead to the simulta-
neous loss of the victim substation as well as the transmission line. Cyber security
problems of substation system have been comprehensively demonstrated in [75].
Cyber-physical switching attack is also one of the CP attacks against the power
transmission grids. An attacker can manipulate switching signals to re-configure
power transmissions and switch the power system to an unstable operation state.
Reference [76] presents that single switching attack can result in the instability of
both frequency and voltage in transmission grid. State estimation (SE) attack is
another kind of centralized attack based on the entire system topology structure.
The state estimation function can achieve the estimation of the state variables to
optimize the system performance [77]. The false data injection attack (FDIA) is
often proposed to analyze the vulnerability in the power system. The SE-based
FDIA has been discussed that an undetectable attack can be generated to affect
the system performance [78,79]. Load redistribution attack, a variant of FDIA, can
redistribute the bus load without changing the total load demands to damage the
power system operation in different time steps [80,81]. A phasor measurement unit
(PMU) is considered to be one of the most important devices in the future of smart
grid. However, GPS signal based on time synchronization can also be attacked by
manipulating the precise timing information in the transmission system [82].
The distribution system is the final stage in the delivery of power electricity. It
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carries the electricity from the transmission system to the individual customer. Mil-
lions of smart meters have been installed in the demand side and more smart meters
will be installed in the future. These smart meters provide bi-link communication
between customers and utilities. The security issue of smart meter is one of the
important challenges against the cyber-physical attacks [83]. This issue mainly can
be identified as energy thefts [84] and information leakages [85]. The former can
lead to varying degrees of economic losses, while the latter may be used to infer
customer behaviour and information.
The electricity market is a system which enable purchases, sales and short-term
trades, generally in the form of electricity price. Bids and offers in electricity market
can supply and demand principles to set the price. The locational marginal prices
(LMPs), determining the price of electricity, is vulnerable to be attacked through SE
function [86]. Many investigations have identified potential schemes for electricity
market attacks [87–90].
2.3.2.3 Defence against CP attacks in Smart Grid
The investigation of potential CP attack schemes can be set into three stages: pro-
tection, detection and mitigation. Protection mainly depends on establishing secure
communications, preserving critical information and mitigating vulnerabilities [91].
A secure communication can effectively remove most of the CP attack threat in
smart grid and reduce the threat of FDIA schemes. In addition, the deployment
of secured devices on critical location is another way to protect the system when
the devices are too expensive to install at all locations in a grid network. Despite
the protection measures, attackers can still launch attacks on components that are
poorly protected. Hence, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) will be the next major
step to defend the smart grid. Early warnings allow system operators to take cor-
rective action to minimize the impacts of attacks. Many detection mechanisms have
been developed in CP attack control system [67, 92–96]. When the warning signal
of CP attacks are confirmed, the system operators will take mitigation measures to
minimize potential disruption and damage. If the attack has been removed from the
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control system, existing recovery mechanisms can effectively restore power system
operations. However, if the threat of attack is not resolved immediately, system
operators need to take other measures to mitigate the potential impact of the threat
or clear threat. Game theoretic approaches have been improved against CP attack
in electrical power system [97]. A three-level decomposition approach is proposed to
optimize the economic cost and to mitigate the interdiction attack [98]. This model
identifies the most critical network component to defend against possible CP attack-
s. For mitigation against FDIA, a coordinated mitigation framework is developed
and the security metrics are proposed to quantify the importance of substations and
the cost of attacks against measurements [99].
2.3.2.4 The Opportunities and challenges in Smart Grid
A smart grid contains a large number of different devices and is vulnerable to be
attacked through cyber-physical structures. Although many researchers have con-
ducted extensive research on CP attacks, the vulnerability of most components in
a smart grid still requires check in case of potential attacks. Demand response and
distributed intelligence may also become one of the most attractive targets for CP
attack in the smart grid network. In addition, there are still many potential un-
known threats. The integration of energy storage, distributed generation and electric
vehicles will create uncertain changes which may cause instability and catastrophic
damage to electrical power system.
The challenges of CP attack for future smart grid can be divided into four main areas:
interdependence, temporal vulnerability, practical attacks and designs of attack-
resilient.
1. Interdependence: Interdependence is the driving force of security develop-
ment in a smart grid. So far, most CP attacks launch attacks in cyber space
and few investigations are found in physical network. However, the threat
can be disruptive when physical system is considered. The vulnerabilities of
physical system should also be investigated in smart grid CP security. At
the same time, the vulnerabilities of interdependence may also be used fre-
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quently to manipulate the communication data or historical information to
induce a power outage or further damage to some critical field devices. To
date, such kind of investigation has remained limited. The interdependence
of smart grid does not only mean the connection between cyber and physi-
cal space, other critical infrastructures are also vulnerable as shown in Fig.
2.8. Smart grid could interconnect actuating devices and monitoring devices
such as circuit breakers, relays, transformers, smart meters and PMUs by way
of intelligent signal processing technologies. These devices can communicate,
perform control strategies locally and intelligently actuate. The information-
centric cyber-enabled smart grid allows active nodes to respond to intelligent
signal processing effectively and adaptively. These frequently changed infor-
mation can be intercepted through cyber channels. Therefore, the revealing
information about the network structure and operating trends can be gleaned
by an attacker and be utilized to perpetrate an insidious CP attack during the
system operation. The investigation of interdependence across infrastructure
still has a lot of work to be done.
Figure 2.8: The overview of smart grid security market [100].
2. Temporal vulnerability: In general, a coordinated intrusion of multiple-
devices can be initiated in a simultaneous manner, timing is not often con-
sidered in terms of the complexity of time domain. However, in practice, the
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timing of attack is very important to the potential impact of a CP attack. At-
tacks during either peak or off-peak times are likely to have different effects on
system stability. The timing and sequence of coordinated attacks will play an
important role in the system blackout. Therefore, it is necessary for the timing
factor to be analyzed for power system network to confirm system stability at
the right time.
3. Imperfect attacks: The worst case study is often simulated to evaluate
the potential impacts of control system. These studies are very important to
demonstrate the possible maximal damage of the system. These studies which
call perfect attacks usually contain all network information and control of the
system. However, these perfect attacks are not feasible in real world scenario.
The system operator may be faced with more imperfect attacks and some
of which may be completely unknown. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
incomplete information to investigate and evaluate all possible attacks due to
limited information and limited available resources. According to the level of
security, knowledge of the system and control compromised by the attackers,
the corresponding hierarchical countermeasures should be proposed to mitigate
the potential threats.
4. Designs of attack-resilience system: Due to the inability to eliminate
each possible attack for a smart grid, the concept of attack-resilient should
be proposed to mitigate all the potential threats. When the control and mea-
surement systems are designed, it should be noted that the security features
are crucial to the stability of the electrical power network. The intelligence
devices in smart grid are not just the targets of the CP attacks, they can also
be the tool to defend the threats. In terms of the upgrade of power system,
the integration of all intelligence devices can enhance the flexibility of its own
protection and be developed to improve the security of potential threats.
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2.4 Conclusions
This chapter first gives an overview of voltage control techniques in power sys-
tem, including traditional voltage control methods and reactive power voltage con-
trol methods. Next, the overview of OPF algorithms is presented, followed by
the ADMM-based optimization algorithm. The modelling studies on the general
consensus version of ADMM algorithm are reviewed in this chapter. Then, the IC-
T challenges in smart grid are discussed, including the stochastic communication
time-delay and the studies on the CP attack in the literature.
Computer modelling is not representative to real world scenarios due to the uncer-
tainties of input values and the communication between the computer model and
real world. More different scenarios are required to be simulated. In order to simu-
late real scenario in the reactive power control system, it is necessary to quantify the
uncertainty of input values and addition the stochastic communication time-delay
model into computer models. In order to systematically and efficiently manage the
uncertainty of input and communication delay, it is necessary to create an appro-
priate strategy to mitigate all the possible damages that may be caused by the
uncertainties. Finally, cyber-physical attacks during the information exchange need
to be highly evaluated when the smart grid is developed in the future.
Chapter 3
Coordinated Reactive Power
Voltage Control Model
3.1 Introduction
In order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, deal with the growing world population,
the decreasing fossil fuels and the rising energy demands, the increasing installation
of DGs is a promising solution. Current hierarchical power system needs to be mod-
ified to adapt the large penetration of distributed generators for electrical energy.
However, these DGs will destabilize the dynamic performance of electrical network.
One of the main challenges is that an appropriate control method to stabilize the
voltage in real-time is required to solve voltage fluctuation due to the unpredictable
output power of DGs. There are several different traditional voltage control methods
(see Section 2.1), such as, On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC), Step Voltage Regulator
(SVR) and Static Var Compensator (SVC). However, these methods have certain
limitations, such as fixed locations, harmonic generation, high investigation and ad-
ditional failure points when the network is upgraded [28]. Considering the require-
ment of real-time control, low cost benefit ratios and flexibility of reactive power, we
propose to utilize the electronic inverter in DGs based on the sensitivity analysis to
regulate the voltage level. It is noteworthy that the proposed decentralized voltage
control method in this chapter considers neighbouring nodes to optimize the reac-
tive power allocation which can increase the total amount of controllable reactive
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power for a single node voltage control. In addition, the time-delay analysis is also
considered to test the performance of the method.
This chapter mainly analyzes the the performance of coordinated decentralized re-
active power voltage control strategy combined with the time-delay model. The
contributions of this chapter are summarised as follows:
• Given the little literature in the research of analysing communication time-
delay in smart grid so far, this chapter links an imperfect communication system to a
coordinated voltage control strategy. This investigation provides a possible research
direction to decentralized control algorithm with limited information exchange.
• The time-delay analysis is presented to show the impact of communication
time-delay on the performance of a coordinated voltage control strategy.
• Simulation results show that, with time-delay, existing approaches cannot con-
trol the voltage level as expected and thus may affect the system stability. The
existing control method needs to be modified to mitigate the impact of the time-
delay introduced by communication systems.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The sensitivity analysis and maxi-
mum capability of inverter for each according to the converter current and voltage
limitations are both discussed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the proposed
modelling of coordinated reactive power control method. When time-delay occurs
during the information exchange, Section 3.4 derives the time-delay modelling into
the proposed method. The simulation results are given in Section 3.5, followed by
the chapter summary in Section 3.6.
3.2 Methodology for Reactive Power Control
Many methods can be used to maintain the voltage level. This section explores a
coordinated control strategy to adjust the reactive power absorption/injection to
regulate the node voltage. In a decentralized method, the limited information ex-
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change still exists in contrast to centralized control manner. However, decentralized
control strategy does not need a control center to gather all the network information
to realize the control. The sensitivity matrix and power capability of inverter are
the key points in the reactive power control strategy.
3.2.1 Network Sensitivity Analysis
The classical sensitivity theory, based on the Jacobian matrix, was utilized in high-
voltage (HV) transmission network to perform the voltage regulation [101]. This
method is known as the Newton-Raphson method which is written as a Taylor Series
with the higher order term ignored. The relationship between the node voltages
(magnitude 4V and angles 4θ) and node injection power (active power 4P and
reactive power 4Q) can be expressed as:
4V
4θ
 = −J−1
4Q
4P
 . (3.1)
where4P and4Q are the deviations of absorbed/injected active power and reactive
power, respectively. J is the matrix of partial derivatives known as the Jacobian
matrix (also called sensitivity matrix). The detail can be written as
4Pi = −Pi +
N∑
k=1
|Vi ||Vk| (Gikcosθik +Biksinθik) (3.2a)
4Qi = −Qi +
N∑
k=1
|Vi ||Vk| (Giksinθik −Bikcosθik) (3.2b)
J =
∂4Q∂V ∂4Q∂θ
∂4P
∂V
∂4P
∂θ
 . (3.2c)
where (3.2a) and (3.2b) are called the mismatch equations. The method described
above is generally valid, however, its computational complexity is too great for real-
istic voltage analysis. For radial distribution network (DN), only voltage magnitude
is required to control the voltage level. Therefore, the simple sensitivity theory
is proposed to our medium voltage distribution network (MVDN). The proposed
theory is easier than normal theory and it is only suitable for the radial network.
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Figure 3.1: The tested network for proposed sensitivity theory
Let us consider the single-phase equivalent circuit of DN in Fig 3.1, which consists
of N nodes. The MV busbar is considered at node 0, the numberings of other nodes
are presented in Fig 3.1. The branch L01, L12, ... are modelled using the RL-direct
sequence equivalent circuit [102] (assuming the shunt parameters are neglected).
The reference voltage level E0 is a constant value set by the OLTC. In a radial DN,
the MV busbar voltage is regulated at E0, the voltage deviation V0i between node 0
and node i can be given by:
V0i = E0 − Ei. (3.3)
where V0i can be treated as the sum of voltage deviation between neighbouring
nodes from node 0 to node i. For example, if i = 3, the voltage deviation V03 can
be calculated as the sum of voltage deviations V01, V12 and V23
V03 = V01 + V12 + V23. (3.4)
We define PTi is the set of path from node 0 to node i. h, k ∈ PTi means node h
and k are the neighbouring nodes which connect to one branch. If i equals to 3, the
path PT3 contains three branches which is 0−1,1−2 and 2−3 seen in Fig 3.1. The
generalised voltage deviation function can be written as,
V0i =
∑
hk∈PTi
Vhk. (3.5)
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For each branch voltage deviation Vhk, the relationship between voltage level and
power flow can be given as [3],
Vhk = Eh − Ek = RhkISkcosϕSk +XhkISksinϕSk
=
EkRhkISkcosϕSk + EkXhkISksinϕSk
Ek
=
RhkPSk +XhkQSk
Ek
.
(3.6)
where Rhk, Xhk, and ISk are the branch resistance, reactance and current, respec-
tively. PSk and QSk are the active and reactive power flow from node h to node k,
respectively. cosϕSk is the power factor. And Ek is the voltage level at node k.
Normally, the voltage level at node k is close to rated voltage value 1p.u., so (3.6)
can be approximated as:
Vhk ≈ RhkPSk+XhkQSk1 = RhkPSk +XhkQSk. (3.7)
We assume that the power loss is negligible compared to the load powers. Then
active power PSk and reactive powers QSk can be approximated as follows:
PSk ≈
∑
q∈DEk
Pq (3.8a)
QSk ≈
∑
q∈DEk
Qq. (3.8b)
where Pq and Qq are the active power and reactive power of the loads connected
downstream of node k, respectively. DEk is the set of active and reactive powers of
loads that installed downstream of node k.
Therefore, we can derive that the voltage deviation V0i is a function of active power
and reactive power of all loads. The voltage level of node i can be obtained in this
way:
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Ei = E0 − V0i = E0 −
∑
hk∈PTi
Vhk
= E0 −
∑
hk∈PTi
(RhkPSk +XhkQSk)
= E0 −
∑
hk∈PTi
(Rhk
∑
q∈DEk
Pq +Xhk
∑
q∈DEk
Qq).
(3.9)
E0 is the constant value, and we can rewrite the (3.9) as:
Ei = F (P,Q). (3.10)
where P and Q are the active power sets P1, P2, ..., PN and reactive power sets
Q1, Q2, ..., QN , respectively. The active and reactive powers are the control variables.
When we change the active and reactive powers, the voltage level of each node will
be changed accordingly. According to equation (3.10), the voltage variation 4Ei of
node i can be given as
4Ei = ∂Ei
∂P1
4 P1 + ∂Ei
∂P2
4 P2 + ...+ ∂Ei
∂PN
4 PN
+
∂Ei
∂Q1
4Q1 + ∂Ei
∂Q2
4Q2 + ...+ ∂Ei
∂QN
4QN
=
N∑
J=1
∂Ei
∂Pj
4 Pj +
N∑
J=1
∂Ei
∂Qj
4Qj.
(3.11)
where ∂Ei
∂Pj
and ∂Ei
∂Qj
are the gain of the voltage variation to node i cased by the active
and reactive power variations in node j, respectively. This partial derivative can
be called as the sensitivity term. Moreover, we can derive the general sensitivity
matrix for all nodes in the network:
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
4E1
4E2
· · ·
4EN
 =

∂E1
∂P1
∂E1
∂P2
· · · ∂E1
∂PN
∂E2
∂P1
∂E2
∂P2
· · · ∂E2
∂PN
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∂EN
∂P1
∂EN
∂P2
· · · ∂EN
∂PN


4P1
4P2
· · ·
4PN
+

∂E1
∂Q1
∂E1
∂Q2
· · · ∂E1
∂QN
∂E2
∂P1
∂E2
∂Q2
· · · ∂E2
∂QN
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∂EN
∂Q1
∂EN
∂Q2
· · · ∂EN
∂QN


4Q1
4Q2
· · ·
4QN
 .
(3.12)
The simplified form of equation (3.12) can be written as
[
4E
]
=
[
sP
] [
4P
]
+
[
sQ
] [
4Q
]
. (3.13)
where 4E is the voltage variation vector. 4P and 4Q are the active and reac-
tive power variation vectors, respectively. sP and sQ are the active and reactive
sensitivity parameter matrix, respectively
It is important to note if the active and reactive power at node j do not change
at the moment, then 4Pj = 0 and 4Qj = 0. In this section, we give priority to
consider the reactive power variation, which also means only reactive powers of DG
nodes are regulated to maintain the voltage level of each node. According to the
equation of sensitivity parameter matrix, it is obvious when we select one DG node
as the main node, the farther away from the main node, the smaller the voltage
variation for same reactive power deviation. Next, we will consider how to regulate
the reactive power output through the power electronic inverter.
3.2.2 Active/Reactive Power Capability of Inverter
In general, the DG is installed to the DN by means of electronic inverter. Among the
decentralized voltage control methods using the reactive power output of DGs, the
maximum capability performance of inverter which could control the output value
of active power and reactive power has recently been researched. Reactive power
regulation from DGs can not only directly control the voltage level in real-time, but
also reduce the requirement of extra reinforcements from the network. The typical
layout of DG with power electronic converter is presented in Fig 3.2.
3.2. Methodology for Reactive Power Control 51
Figure 3.2: Outline of control system with power electronic converter
The grid-side converter has a certain maximum current-carrying capacity, which will
impose a limit on the active and reactive power capability of DG. In Fig 3.3, the PQ
plane of DG, for example, PV array and wind turbine, is similar to a synchronous
generator [1]. The relationship between the active power P cDG and reactive power
QcDG under the converter current limit is
P cDG
2 +QcDG
2 = (VDGIc)
2. (3.14)
where Ic is the converter-side current. VDG is the grid-side voltage. VDG is not a
constant value. If VDG increases, IC will decrease and vice versa.
Another limitation of the power capability is the converter voltage Vc, which is
similar to the field current limit of a traditional synchronous generator. Then the
relationship between the active power P vDG and reactive power Q
v
DG under the con-
verter voltage limit is
P vDG
2 + (QvDG +
V 2DG
Xc
)2 = (VDGVc
X
)2. (3.15)
where Vc is the convert-side voltage. Xc is the total equivalent reactance of the
3.2. Methodology for Reactive Power Control 52
Figure 3.3: Capability curve with power electronic converter
transformers and grid filters from converter side to grid side (seen in Fig. 3.2).
In Fig 3.3, equation (3.14) represents the curve of converter current limitation and
equation (3.15) represents the curve of converter voltage limitation. In addition, for
converter voltage limitation, the equation (3.15) shows a circle with center c and
radius r. The maximum reactive power output not only meets the constraints of
converter current and voltage limitations, but also be determined by the current
maximum output of active power. In order to calculate the maximum value of
reactive power output, it is necessary to set a certain band of voltages and frequencies
at the grid connection point. Let us define the Xc = 0.3, VDG,max = 1.05p.u.,
VDG,min = 0.95p.u., fmax = 1.01p.u., fmin = 0.98p.u. [103]. And θR is the rated
power factor angle. In term of these parameters, we can calculate the maximum
value of converter voltage and current. The converter current Ic in (3.14) can be
written as
Ic =
√
P cDG
2+QcDG
2
VDG
. (3.16)
where the active power P cDG and reactive power Q
c
DG are rated values, and the DG
output voltage VDG is the minimum value, the maximum value of converter current
can be obtained.
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Ic,max =
√
P cDG,R
2+QcDG,R
2
VDG,min
=
√
P cDG,R
2+P cDG,RtanθR
2
VDG,min
. (3.17)
where P cDG,R and Q
c
DG,R are the rated active and reactive power, respectively. Then
the maximum converter current Ic,max can be converted into the format of p.u. by
considering PDG,R as the base of the system
Ic,max =
√
1+tan2θR
VDG,min
. (3.18)
Then the converter voltage in (3.15) can be written as
Vc =
Xc
VDG
√
P vDG
2 + (QvDG +
VDG
2
Xc
)2 = Xc
VDG
√
P vDG
2 + (P vDGtanθ +
VDG
2
Xc
)2. (3.19)
where the active power P vDG and reactive power Q
v
DG are rated values, and the DG
voltage VDG is the maximum value. The maximum converter voltage in p.u. can be
given by
Vc,max =
fmaxXc
V vDG,max
√
1 + (tanθR +
VDG,max
2
fmaxXc
)2. (3.20)
According to (3.14), (3.15), (3.18) and (3.20), we can obtain the maximum reactive
power output value by
QcDG =
√
(Ic,maxVDG)2 − P cDG2 (3.21a)
QvDG =
√
(
VDGVc,max
Xc
)2 − P vDG2 −
V 2DG
Xc
. (3.21b)
where QcDG and Q
v
DG are the maximum reactive power output by the limitation of
maximum converter current and limitation of maximum converter voltage, respec-
tively.
For different active power output value, the maximum reactive power output will
be different with respect to the limitations. Combining (3.21a) and (3.21b), the
maximum available reactive power capability can be given by
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Q = min (QcDG, Q
v
DG). (3.22)
According to the equation (3.22), with different active power output of DGs, each
DG can adjust the power factor to absorb or inject the reactive power into the node
to control the voltage level. Fig. 3.4 presents the reactive power capability curve
under different power factor points. This curve explains that each number of active
power with specific power factor working point has the maximum reactive power
output. In other words, if the maximum reactive power injection/absorption can
not maintain the node voltage into the operation point, it is necessary to curtail the
active power output because of the constraint of bus voltage level. Consequently,
the controllable P/Q capability curve is an important part for distribution generator
to control reactive power output.
Figure 3.4: Reactive power capability curve.
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3.3 Proposed Model of Coordinated Voltage Con-
trol Method
This section will present the coordinated voltage control strategy by controlling
the active and reactive power between DGs. According to the above sensitivity
coefficient matrix and the capability of power output, each DG can control the
active and reactive power to regulate the voltage level. Reference [12] presents
an independent voltage control strategy which only considers self-node’s voltage
regulation without any cooperation. However, if one DG is out of service or when
other extreme situation occurs, the voltage of this node will be out of control by self
node and only neighbouring nodes can control the voltage level. In the meantime,
the independent control strategy will also be affected and may not be able to adjust
the voltage to within the specified range. Hence, we propose a coordinated voltage
control method which will control the voltage level cooperatively with neighbouring
nodes and extend the controllable range. Meanwhile, it can prevent the disadvantage
that the voltage level can not be controlled when the DG of main node loses its ability
to work.
According to the sensitivity analysis, it is obvious that the active/reactive power
output of each DG can both impact other nodes’ voltage levels. We define a concept
of Most Influential Generator (MIG) here. When node i is considered as the main
node (MN), each DG in this network can regulate its own active/reactive power
to control voltage level of node i. In terms of sensitivity parameters, the closer
the distance from the node i, the greater the impact on the voltage level of node
i. Therefore, we prefer to choose neighbouring DGs to regulate the voltage level
cooperatively.
In this cooperative decentralized control approach, when DGs are connected to nodes
and the network parameters are fixed, each node will have a constant sensitivity
coefficient. Under normal conditions, we only consider to change the reactive power
output to regulate the voltage level. In case reactive power output reaches the
maximum value, the active power curtailment will be considered. The main voltage
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variation of node i can be shown as
4V Pi =
4PDGi1
ρPi1
+
4PDGi2
ρPi2
+ ...+
4PDGiM
ρPiM
(3.23a)
4V Qi =
4QDGi1
ρQi1
+
4QDGi2
ρQi2
+ ...+
4QDGiM
ρQiM
. (3.23b)
where ρPi1, ρ
P
i2,...,ρ
P
iM are the active power sensitivity coefficients of node i, respective-
ly. ρQi1,ρ
Q
i2,...,ρ
Q
iM are the reactive power sensitivity coefficients of node i, respective-
ly. ∆PDGi1 , ∆P
DG
i2 ,..., ∆P
DG
iM are DG active power variations, respectively. ∆Q
DG
i1 ,
∆QDGi2 ,..., ∆Q
DG
iM are DG reactive power variations, respectively. ∆V
Q
i , ∆V
P
i are
voltage variation due to ∆QDG and ∆PDG, respectively.
In general, the reactive power variations of neighbouring DGs will have the largest
influence on the MN. The control strategy will control the voltage level cooperatively
with neighbouring DGs. The outline of control strategy can be found in Fig. 3.5.
The red box is the core of cooperative control part which can enlarge the controllable
range of reactive power compensation. The detail is discussed as follows:
First of all, the measuring equipment will always detect the voltage level of DG
node i and send the current detected parameters to neighbouring DG. The detected
voltage deviation between current voltage level Vi(k) and threshold value can be
given by
∆Vi(k) = Vi(k)− (V maxi − εi). (3.24)
where k is the time step for each loop, V maxi and εµ are the upper limit voltage value
and upper threshold value of node i, respectively. The value for each εi is different
and depended on the location of node in the network.
If the voltage of main DG (MDG) node exceeds the specified maximum or minimum
value(we set the maximum voltage level 1.05 p.u. and the minimum voltage level
0.95 p.u.), the power electronic inverter will take action to regulate the reactive
power output to adjust the voltage level into the operative range. At the beginning
of control strategy, only reactive power compensation will be considered. In terms
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of the reactive power capability and sensitivity coefficients, the maximum allowed
reactive power output will be computed and the exact requirement of reactive power
can also be obtained. When the main DG receives the message from neighbouring
DGs, it will compute to distribute the reactive power output of each DG according
to the received message. In this strategy, we only consider the neighbouring nodes as
the MIGs. Hence, the MDG and MIGs can regulate the voltage level of main node
cooperatively. Then the total amount of injected/absorbed reactive power for node
i, the sum of adjustable reactive power of all involved neighbouring MIGs based on
the sensitivity coefficient from MIGs to the MN, will be shown as
Figure 3.5: Cooperative decentralized reactive power control flowchart
Qcap(k) = ∆Qi(k) +
∆Qi+1(k)
ρQii+1
ρQii +
∆Qi−1(k)
ρQii−1
ρQii . (3.25)
where ∆Qi+1(k) is the effectively adjustable reactive power. ρ
Q
ii+1 and ρ
Q
ii−1 are
sensitivity coefficients of forward node and backward node to node i, respectively.
ρQii is the self node reactive power sensitivity coefficient. ∆Qi+1(k) and ∆Qi−1(k)
3.3. Proposed Model of Coordinated Voltage Control Method 58
are the available reactive power variations of forward node and backward node to
node i, respectively.
It is obvious that Qcap(k) is larger than the reactive power capability of single DG
∆Qi(k). According to the requirement of reactive power, it is necessary to determine
whether to reduce the active power or not. The correlation expression can be shown
as
Q
′
i(k) = max(Qcap(k), Qi(k)−∆Vi(k) · ρQii ). (3.26)
where Q
′
i(k) is the current required reactive power output. Qi(k) is the current
reactive power output. ∆Vi(k) is the voltage variation that requires to be adjusted.
According to equation (3.26), if the requirement of reactive power Q
′
i(k) is smaller
than Qcap(k), it means that the reactive power is enough to control the voltage
level into operative range. The amount of reactive power compensation for each DG
will be calculated. Then the detail of reactive power regulation that is required for
each node will be sent to neighbouring DGs to perform the regulation. It should be
noted that the reactive power variation of MDG and MIGs will also influence MIGs’
voltage level. Therefore, the amount of reactive power allocated by each node will be
taken into account carefully (through the reactive power sensitivity matrix) in case
the voltage of neighbouring node exceeds the maximum value. After receiving the
message from MDG, the control instruction will apply to the DG directly. Otherwise,
the active power curtailment will happen. In the meantime, in terms of the reactive
power capability curve, different active power output will have different maximum
reactive power output. The variation of active power curtailment ∆Pi(k) can be
written as
∆Pi(k) =
Qi(k)−Q′cap(k)
ρQii
ρPii . (3.27)
where Q
′
cap(k) is the current maximum reactive power output in terms of current ac-
tive power output. ∆Pi(k) is the active power variation that requires to be adjusted.
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ρPii is the self node active power sensitivity coefficient.
Then, the current modified active power output P
′
i (k) can be obtained.
P
′
i (k) = Pi(k)−∆Pi(k). (3.28)
The active power curtailment only happens when the reactive power is not enough to
reduce the voltage level. The right part of Fig 3.5 demonstrates if the active power
output does not reach the maximum output value after active power curtailment,
the active power enhancement can occur. The active power changes will affect the
maximum controllable reactive power capability. Therefore, if the voltage level do
not exceed the maximum value, the curtailed active power output can be adjusted.
When the active power output is lower than the current maximum allowable output
Pma(k), the active power can be regulated by increasing the voltage level. The
voltage variation will be detected first. When the available voltage variation is not
equal to zero, the active power output can be increased by enhancing the voltage
level. Otherwise, the reactive power adjustment can be applied. The related active
power adjustment expression can be shown as
P
′
i (k) = min(Pma(k), Pi(k)−∆Vi(k)ρPii). (3.29)
In terms of the voltage variation ∆Vi(k), it is clear to check how much voltage
variation can be used to improve the active power output. If the active power
increases to maximum allowable output Pma(k), it will apply to the DG directly.
Otherwise, the reactive power adjustment will be taken into account.
Q
′
i(k) = Qi(k)− ∆Pi(k)ρ
Q
ii
ρPii
. (3.30)
where ∆Pi(k) = Pma(k)−P ′i (k) is the active power variation after the active power
adjustment. The modified reactive power can decrease the voltage level. Then the
active power will be increased again by increasing the voltage level. If the reactive
power requirement is less than the reactive power capability, the requirement value
Q
′
i(k) will be used directly to DG, which can reduce the voltage level. Otherwise, the
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maximum capacity value Qcap(k) will be applied to calculate the voltage variation.
The revised active power can be written as:
P
′
i (k) = min(Pma(k), Pi(k)− (Qcap(k)−Qi(k))ρ
P
ii
ρQii
). (3.31)
where Qcap(k)−Qi(k) is the maximum available reactive power variation when the
requirement of reactive power variation is larger than the maximum capability.
Then the revised reactive power can be utilized to the DG to enhance the active pow-
er output. The proposed cooperative decentralized control strategy can effectively
control the node voltage level compared to the independent DG control approach.
In addition, this algorithm can reduce the possibility of active power curtailment.
This novel voltage control approach can improve the efficiency of control method
and optimize the allocation of reactive power. However, the proposed strategy still
requires a certain limited information exchange. It is necessary to analyze the effect
of time-delay on the algorithm.
3.4 Time-delay Analysis in Decentralized Control
Voltage Method
The uncertainty of renewable energy output and energy demand can affect the volt-
age value. And the communication time-delay always exists during the information
exchange. In order to implement the control in real time, the control strategy should
adapt an effective and fast communication technology to improve the control speed.
There are several kinds of communication technologies that can be chosen for en-
abling smart grid communications. The existing cellular network can be a good
option. The 3rd Generation (3G) network can be considered as the backbone of a
smart grid communication solution [104]. It has many advantages, such as mature
technology, already deployed base stations, a wide coverage, low investment, and
large capacity.
Using a coordinated control approach, the time-delay (including communication
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system delay and decision-making delay) among DGs or controllers could affect
the effectiveness of the control algorithm. Without any time-delays, conventional
control strategy can effectively regulate the voltage level within the operating range.
However, when time-delay is applied, it becomes challenging to control the voltage
level. The following part describes a simple communication time-delay model.
Figure 3.6: Exchange of control signals in a communication system.
Fig. 3.6 shows a basic communication system. First of all, if voltage level of DG1 is
out of the operating range, the reactive power injection/absorption will be calculated
by using sensitivity coefficients. Then the reactive power compensation signal will
be sent to base station (BS), which could forward it to selected neighbouring MIGs,
such as DG2 and DG3. Once the MIGs receive the control signal, they will modify
the power factor to control. Meanwhile, the MIGs will also acknowledge DG1 to
make sure that the control signal is received and operated.
According to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 9 [105], the
time-delay can be obtained as follows.
1. Set environment, network layout, and antenna array parameters: a) choose
a scenario (Indoor, Micro cellular, Base coverage urban or High speed); b)
determine the number of BSs and DG; c) determine the locations of BSs and
DGs, or the distance of each BS and DG and relative direction of each BS and
DG; d) determine BSs and DGs antenna field patterns and array geometries;
e) determine BSs and DGs array orientations with respect to north (reference)
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direction; f) determine speed and direction of motion of DGs; g) determine
system centre frequency
2. Assign the propagation condition, i.e. line-of-sight (LOS) or non-LOS (NLOS).
3. Calculate the path loss for each BS-DG link in the system.
4. Generate other parameters, i.e. delay spread, angular spreads and shadow
fading term.
5. Calculate the delays τ . Time-delay is drawn randomly from the delay distri-
bution defined in [106], with an exponential delay distribution in DN scenarios
as below:
τ
′
i,j = −σi,jri,jln(Xi,j). (3.32)
where i and j are the transmitter index and receiver index, respectively. σi,j is the
delay spread, ri,j is the delay distribution proportionality factor, Xi,j ∼ Uni(0,1)
and index i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ...,M . With uniform delay distribution, the time delay
values τ
′
i,j are drawn from the corresponding range.
The stochastic end-to-end delay over a fixed path mainly consists of two components:
a deterministic delay (all routers processing delay) and a stochastic delay (assuming
mainly caused by internet traffic). Normalise the delays by subtracting the minimum
deterministic delay and sort the normalised delays to descending order:
τi,j = sort{τ ′i,j − τmini,j }. (3.33)
where τmini,j is the deterministic delay which is a fixed minimum time for each path.
Equation (3.32) presents the random time-delay calculation. This equation explains
that each communication time between DGs, which is not a fixed value for every in-
formation exchange, can reach a relatively high value. In practice, as measurements
can be time stamped, it is convenient to know exact timedelay by comparing this
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time stamp with the received time of measurement signal.
Note: 3G has been an obsolete technology due to the explosive growth in cellular
communications in past few years. Now, 4G technology is already on the verge of
occupying the market and soon will revolutionize the existing systems [16]. The
upcoming 5G will be an appropriate technology with less communication system
time-delay. Besides this, there exists decision-making delay. When we consider the
power system optimization, the decision-making time-delay may become dominant.
In addition, it is also necessary to investigate the communication delay systems for
different systems in different areas.
3.5 Case Study Results
3.5.1 IEEE 33 Bus Network Case
Figure 3.7: Single-line 33-bus distribution system diagram.
A medium-voltage (MV) distribution networks have been adopted as the case study
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network for the purposes of this research. This case study network represents an
urban generic radial distribution system [13]. This network has 33 buses, 32 branches
and 5 tie lines as can be seen from the single-line diagram depicted below in Fig. 3.7.
The total real and reactive power loads on this system are 3750 kW and 2300 kVar,
respectively. Then the original voltage profile can be obtained by NewtonRaphson
method power flow which can be seen below in Fig. 3.8. For many power transformer
applications, a supply interruption during a tap change is unacceptable, and the
transformer is often fitted with a more expensive and complex On Load Tap Changer
(OLTC, sometime Load Tap Changer, LTC). As can be seen, the voltage level of
bus 1 is set by the primary substation transformer’s OLTC which can be considered
as a fixed value. Voltage levels in bus 18 and bus 33 are only 0.9141 p.u. and
0.9243, perspectively. The values are both lower than the minimum allowable voltage
0.95 p.u. because of the radial structure of the network. We set threshold value
typically as 0.05 which means the maximum allowable voltage is 1.05 p.u. and the
minimum allowable voltage is 0.95 p.u., following the ANSI C84.1-2006 standard
[107]. Therefore, it is necessary to take measures to adjust the voltage level into the
normal operation range.
Figure 3.8: Voltage profile through Newton-Raphson method in 33-bus system.
In this section, we propose to utilize the reactive power of DGs to regulate the
voltage level. There are two different types of DG which are applied under the
test in order to obtain a general validation of the proposed decentralized voltage
control approach, Wind Distributed Generation Unit (WDGU) and Photovoltaics
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(PV). Four WDGUs and four PVs have been connected to the 33-bus network,
respectively. The connection buses are also highlighted in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.9,
where the rated power value of the DGs are specified.
Table 3.1: WDGU and PV location and parameters
Parameters
DG Rated Power (MW) Location (Bus)
WDGU 2.5 2, 12, 15, 18
PV 2.2 23, 25, 27, 33
Figure 3.9: 33-bus system with distribution generators.
The single line diagram of the 33-bus distribution network with the DGs penetration
is shown in Fig. 3.9. We assume that the WDGU and PV both have the same rated
power, which are 2.5 MW and 2.2 MW, respectively.
Fig. 3.10 shows the wind and solar generation active power output profiles of one-
day data in the UK in October 2015 from Solax Power Ltd. It is clear that the
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Figure 3.10: Generation active power output profiles for WDGU and PV.
solar power reaches the peak value around 2 pm in the daytime and almost no
output for the whole evening. Contrarily, the wind energy can always maintain a
certain output. When the DGs are applied into the DN, the simulation results of
the power flow have been analyzed by Matpower/MATLAB, in order to investigate
the assessment of the voltage profile.
3.5.2 Simulation Results without Considering Time-Delay
Figure 3.11: DG-bus voltage levels without any control action.
In the simulations, Fig. 3.11 depicts the voltage profile without any control actions
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Figure 3.12: DG-bus voltage levels with control action.
when the DGs are installed to the DN. Without loss of generality and due to the
infringement of upper operation range shown in Fig. 3.11, the control strategy has
been run to optimize only the upper thresholds. It is clear that during two time
periods (3:30 h to 5:00 h and 11:00 h to 16:00 h) voltage levels of some buses exceed
the upper limited voltage value. Given the fact that nearly 90% of all power outages
and disturbance are originated in the distribution system, the move towards the
smart grid has to start at the distribution level of the power system. The maximum
voltage is almost 1.09 p.u. which may lead to a series of issues and even cause
the power outages. When the decentralized voltage control strategy is applied, the
voltage level will be reduced to a normal operating range.
Fig. 3.12 presents the voltage level of DG buses after the control action. It is obvious
that the voltage levels are under the regulatory limits after control action. As can be
seen from Fig. 3.12, all the node voltages exceeding the maximum value are adjusted
to 1.05 p.u. or less, which means that the proposed coordinated decentralized control
approach can effectively control the voltage level within the variable generation
power output. In addition, it is found that other two DGs (DG12 and DG15 who is
close to DG18) have a large variation, in comparison to other DG buses in the same
network. Consequently, It is worthwhile to emphasize that the control method using
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the reactive power variation and the sensitivity coefficients can be implemented for
temporary over voltage mitigation (e.g., during emergency conditions, high energy
demand or high active power injection).
The voltage oscillations (e.g., from 3:30 h to 5:00 h) depend on the wind generator
power output. According to the sensitivity coefficients, we set DG18 as the MDG.
DG15 is also more powerful than DG12 which means the sensitivity coefficient from
DG15 to DG18 is greater (in absolute value) than the sensitivity coefficient from
DG12 to DG18. Therefore, the reactive power of DG15 has the greatest impact on
the voltage variation of the DG18, followed by the DG12. In contrast, when voltage
variations of other DGs are considered, it is evident that the voltage variations of
other DGs in Fig. 3.12 are much smaller than the voltage variations of DG12 and
DG15. In this case, it is obvious that according to the radial structure of network,
the DG12 with a small sensitivity coefficient value is farther than the DG15 with a
large sensitivity coefficient value from DG18. Although some nodes are far from the
MDG, they may have a greater impact on the voltage variation of MDG than those
that are closer to the MDG. If it happens, the sensitivity coefficients table can be
utilized exactly to choose the DGs which have the greatest impact to MDG.
Figure 3.13: DG-bus reactive power injection without cooperative control.
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Furthermore, compared with the independent approach, the coordinated approach
can adjust the power factors of neighbouring nodes cooperatively in order to enlarge
the total reactive power capability. To investigate the difference of reactive power
absorption between two approaches, the reactive power absorption of independent
control approach and cooperative control approach are shown in Fig. 3.13 and Fig
3.14, respectively. When the voltage rise occurs, Fig. 3.13 shows the reactive power
compensation value after the operation of the independent control action. It shows
that DG15 has the largest reactive power compensation value which is almost 0.45
p.u., in comparison to the compensation values of other DGs. Moreover, 0.45 p.u.
is already 92% of the maximum capability. When the requirement of reactive power
increases in case of some conditions, the reactive power compensation will not be
enough to reduce the voltage level due to the maximum reactive power capability
curve and the active power curtailment will be required in advance.
Figure 3.14: DG-bus reactive power injection with cooperative control.
On the contrary, the compensation performance of the cooperative approach is bet-
ter than that of the independent approach, which is shown in Table 3.2 and Fig.
3.14. Meanwhile, the control results of voltage level for each node are the same as
the independent control method. It is assumed that the WDGUs at bus 12,15,18
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Table 3.2: Reactive Power Injection by Different Approaches
Independent control Cooperative control
Maximum output Maximum output
Bus 12 0.33 p.u. 0.34 p.u.
Bus 15 0.45 p.u. 0.34 p.u.
Bus 18 0.18 p.u. 0.34 p.u.
have the same maximum capability. Comparing with the independent control ap-
proach, the cooperative control approach can decrease the maximum reactive power
output from 0.45 p.u. to 0.34 p.u. as seen in Table 3.2. In addition, 0.34 p.u.
can greatly reduce the possibility of active power curtailment occurrence even if the
network loads are higher than usual. The normal maximum reactive power output
is 0.49 p.u. for each DG according to (3.22). When the large requirement of reactive
power compensation or load fluctuation happens, only 0.04 p.u. reactive power in
the independent control strategy are available to regulate the voltage level without
triggering an active power curtailment. In contrast, in the cooperative control ap-
proach, the MDG still has 0.15 p.u. of reactive power to regulate the voltage of
MN, and neighbouring MIGs also have 0.15 p.u. that can be required to adjust the
voltage of the MN. Meanwhile, the reactive power 0.45 p.u. in this case means the
low power factor. Low power factor can significantly impact the DG performance.
In the meantime, if the main DG is out of work, the neighbouring nodes can still
adjust the voltage level of the MN through the reactive power adjustment of their
own DGs. Consequently, the proposed cooperative voltage control strategy can not
only control a wider scope of voltage fluctuation, but also enhance the robustness of
the algorithm when an unexpected event occurs. However, it should be emphasized
that this coordinated control strategy does not consider the optimization problem
during the control action. It is possible to investigate the multi-objective optimiza-
tion during the allocation of reactive power among neighbouring nodes in the future,
such as the minimization of system power loss and voltage control.
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3.5.3 Simulation Results Considering Time-Delay
In the preceding section, the control method does not consider the effect of the
communication time-delay. However, in a real distribution system based on the
cooperative control method, the communication time-delay always exist between
neighbouring DGs and the normal algorithm with information exchange will always
be affected by the time-delay.
To investigate the influence of communication time-delay, Fig. 3.15 demonstrates the
voltage levels of DG buses when the control approach considers the communication
time-delay. Without considering time-delay, the voltage level shown in Fig. 3.12
can be steadily controlled within the limited value. However, the voltage level is out
of control which can be found in Fig. 3.15. This result is presented in one minute
from 12:30 h to 12:31 h.
There are three different scenarios to show the effect of the time-delay, which all
voltage levels will be affected. S1 stands for the sudden increased active power
output of PVs, in which case the voltage level will increase. S2 stands for the
sudden power generation caused by large wind speed changes, in which case the
output of active power of DG will increase dramatically. S3 stands for the sudden
power blackout of high power machine, in which case the excess active power will
increase the voltage level. It shows that the voltage levels in all three cases will be
out of control if the time-delay occurs. The reason is that delayed massage will make
the control algorithm difficult to operate the control action in real time. Then at
the beginning of each scenario, the voltage level will be always out of control. Power
system stability could be affected by voltage collapse from a second to tens of minutes
and transient voltage fluctuation is often the main concern [108]. According to Fig.
3.15, the voltage level is over the limited value 1.05 p.u. during the control action
due to the emergency conditions. If it happens in real power systems, the system
performance and electrical equipments would be damaged. If the voltage drop or
rise is too large in few seconds, the power system even can not be restored again.
Voltage stability is affected by various components in a wide time range. Therefore,
it is necessary to consider the time-delay model and modify the control strategy
3.6. Chapter Summary 72
to maintain the voltage level when time-delay or packet loss happens. The time-
delay analysis can improve the control approach to maintain the voltage properly
and reduce the incidence of system instability. Relevant investigation of modified
cooperative control strategy to fit the time-delay could be a new research direction
in future.
Figure 3.15: Voltage level with time-delay in three different scenarios.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has derived a cooperative decentralized voltage control approach. The
widespread utilization of large number of DGs installed in MVDN can result in
voltage fluctuation issues because of the uncertainty output. The voltage rise can
induce loss of partial load and reduce the life span of equipment. The proposed
decentralized voltage control approach, based on the sensitivity analysis coefficient,
can regulate the voltage level into the operating range by choosing more than one
generator to control the voltage level cooperatively.
The proposed control method is able to monitor the voltage level and compensate
the reactive power into the DN effectively when time-delay is not significant and
can be ignored. Meanwhile, the concept of MIGs could be applied to reduce the
possibility of active power curtailment occurrence in advance and improve the DG
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power factor. The line resistance in MV network can not be ignored comparing with
that in HV network. Therefore, the reactive power flow reduction can decrease the
power loss.
The 33-bus MVDN is used to verify the proposed control method on smart grid
development in the future without considering time delay. If the time delay is
considered, the control method cannot control the voltage level effectively. A more
effective control strategy should be proposed in order to fit the delay system. Due
to greater complexity of electrical network with DGs, it is necessary to revise the
control algorithm to regulate the voltage in real-time. Moreover, the cooperation
with traditional reactive power compensator can also be applied into the system
to control the voltage. In addition, the optimization problem can be considered
both to regulate the voltage level and to optimize the system power loss during the
decentralized control.
Chapter 4
Modelling of ADMM-Based
Optimal Power Flow
4.1 Introduction
The future smart grid, which leverages advanced information and communications
technology (ICT) to facilitate power system operation and control, is vulnerable to
communication time-delay or packet loss [109–112]. The large penetrations of DGs
in distribution grid could benefit to the power system, for example, increasing energy
diversity, improving reliability and reducing environmental pollution. These DGs
can provide a large quantity of ancillary services that are of great interest to the
optimization of the grid [8,113]. In order to realize the autonomous power systemin
real-time, it is significant to migrate control strategy from traditional centralized
approach to decentralized approach.
The ADMM approach, which is an augmented Lagrangian-based algorithm, is a
popular choice due to the robust and fast convergence results both in theory and
practice [114]. In literature, few papers discuss a fully decentralized OPF problem
with stochastic communication delay in a distribution network. The main work in
this chapter proposes a feasible fully distributed optimization approach to regulate
the reactive power output of DGs. The majority of recent papers also have not
investigated this particular decentralized OPF problem with both synchronous and
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asynchronous time-delay models. The asynchronous model means that each node
could operate its own iterative step without considering the time synchronization
of other nodes. For our work, we mainly concentrate on the medium-voltage dis-
tribution network, but the experimental results are also applicable to transmission
network and low-voltage distribution network. The novelty of this chapter is to ana-
lyze the effect of communication time-delay on the performance of both synchronous
and asynchronous algorithms. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• The ADMM algorithm has been investigated for decades in power system, a
fully decentralized reactive power optimization approach with a little coordination
of neighbouring nodes is studied to solve the optimization problem. We develop
the ADMM algorithm [14] to simulate the convergence result in optimization OPF
problem. An improved iterative step is proposed to minimize the power loss which
presents an efficient convergence result in this paper. The investigation of conver-
gence speed could provide a reference to design a similar kind of algorithm.
• Both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms that consider communication
time-delay are proposed in this chapter. By comparing with the results of the syn-
chronous algorithm without delay, although the asynchronous algorithm has a larger
time-delay tolerance on the iterative process, the proposed asynchronous algorithm
without delay still has a better convergence speed and optimization results during
the same wall clock time period. Compared to other decentralized OPF algorithm-
s, this work not only adds the state-of-the-art communication delay model to the
ADMM algorithm, but also explores the convergence performance of proposed syn-
chronous and asynchronous algorithms with time-delay. Furthermore, the simulation
results prove that the communication delay has a significant influence on the results
of decentralized ADMM algorithm. When time-delay is considered, the traditional
decentralized algorithm even cannot converge properly.
• As the fluctuation in experimental results with time-delay, we proposed four
strategies, such as, skipping strategy (SS), previous value strategy (PVS), autore-
gressive (AR) strategy (ARS)and weighted AR strategy (WARS), to optimize the
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synchronous and asynchronous convergence results. The proposed weighted AR
ADMM can effectively improve the convergence results for both synchronous and
asynchronous algorithms and also dramatically reduce the fluctuation of the results
significantly in the ADMM algorithm with different probabilities of time-delay.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly introduces formulation of
problem in ADMM algorithm. Using the distributed consensus optimization theory,
the sufficient improved ADMM recursive algorithm are proposed in Section 4.3.
The stochastic communication delay model, which contain a deterministic delay
and a stochastic delay, is discussed in Section 4.4.1. The message transmission
mechanism of synchronous and asynchronous algorithms are introduced in Section
4.4.2. The proposed four optimized strategies are also discussed in Section 4.5 to
assess the performance of the strategies. Simulation results are presented in Section
4.6, followed by discussions and conclusions in Section 4.7.
Figure 4.1: Single line diagram of a main distribution feeder.
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4.2 Formulation of Problem
4.2.1 Distribution System Power Flow Formulation
Power flow in a distribution system always obeys physical laws, for example, Kir-
choff laws and Ohm law [115], which become part of the constraints in the capacitor
placement problem. In this section, we present power flow equations for radial dis-
tribution systems. The formulation is conductive to establish the effective solution
methods. For pedagogic convenience, we first consider a special case where only one
main feeder is presented in Fig. 4.1. The derived equation can also be applied to the
general case including laterals. To simplify the presentation, the system is assumed
to be a balanced three-phase system.
In Fig. 4.1, the voltage level in bus 1 represents the substation bus voltage magni-
tude and is assumed to be a constant value. The Lines are represented by a series
impedance zi = ri + jxi and a power flow Si = Pi + jQi, respectively. The loads
can be treated as a constant power si = pi + jqi. The reactive power output of DG
will be represented as variable reactive power source. Meanwhile, the communica-
tion links are displayed for the information exchange of iterative procedure. It is a
bi-direction communication between neighbouring nodes. This network has n + r
nodes and n + r − 1 branches. We define ν as the set of nodes and β as the set
of branches. (i,j) ∈ β means nodes i,j are neighbouring nodes (because of lateral
branches, some nodes may have two or more neighbouring nodes), and Ni denotes
as the set of i’s neighbouring nodes.
With this representation, the network will become a ladder network. If the power
supplied S1 = P1+jQ1 from the substation is known, then the power and the voltage
level at the receiving end of the first branch can be written as follows,
S2 = S1 − Sloss − s2 = S1 − z1 |S1|
2
V 21
− s2 (4.1a)
V2∠θ2 = V1 − z1I1 = V1 − z1S
∗
1
V1
. (4.1b)
where θ1 is the voltage angle. Repeating the same process will yield the following
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recursive formula for each branch on the main feeder.
Pi+1 = Pi − ri+1P
2
i +Q
2
i
V 2i
− pi+1 (4.2a)
Qi+1 = Qi − xi+1P
2
i +Q
2
i
V 2i
− qi+1 (4.2b)
V 2i+1 = V
2
i − 2(riPi + xiQi) + (r2i + x2i )
P 2i +Q
2
i
V 2i
. (4.2c)
where Pi and Qi are the active and reactive power flows from node i to node i+ 1.
Vi is the bus voltage magnitude at node i.
Both pi and qi are composed of local consumption minus local generation due to the
DG inverter, which can be found in Fig. 4.1.
pi = piL − piG (4.3a)
qi = qiL − qiG. (4.3b)
In terms of these four different parameters in (4.3), we assume that piL, piG and qiL
are uncontrollable parameters (i.e., driven by consumer load or instantaneous DG
generation). On the contrary, the reactive power generated by the DG inverter, qiG,
can be adjusted within limits.
Note that we have the following terminal conditions:
V1 = Vcons (4.4a)
Pn = Qn = 0. (4.4b)
where Vcons is the constant voltage magnitude for substation voltage. And the active
and reactive power flows at the end of the main feeder can be treated as zero.
The DistFlow equations can be generalized to include laterals. Consider a lateral
branch out from the main feeder as shown in Fig. 4.2. For notational simplicity, the
lateral branch out from node m will be referred to as the lateral m and the node m
will be referred to as the lateral node.
4.2. Formulation of Problem 79
Figure 4.2: One-line main feeder with a lateral branching network.
The same process of DistFlow Equations of main feeder will be repeated for the
lateral branch by using the formulas in (4.2) and the new terminal conditions can
be set as Pmr = Qmr = 0. The DistFlow equations can be utilized to determine
the operating point. The special structure of the DistFlow equation can be used
to develop a computationally efficient and numerically robust solution algorithm.
Consequently, we prefer to use the ADMM algorithm over conventional optimiza-
tion algorithm because the augmented Lagrangian-based ADMM algorithm has the
robust and fast convergence results in theory and practice [114].
4.2.2 Global Optimization Problem
Our target in this chapter is to maximize the system operation efficiency, i.e., the
minimization problem of power loss:
Plos = min

power loss︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈1···ν
(Fi(Si))
 . (4.5)
where Fi is the power loss function of the ith node, ν is the total number of network
nodes, and Si is the complex power flow from node i to node i + 1. Si can also be
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written as Si = Pi + jQi, where Pi and Qi are the active and reactive power flow
from node i to node i+ 1, respectively.
According to formula (4.2), the details of the power loss minimization function can
be written as
∑
i∈1···ν
(Fi(Si)) =
∑
i∈1···ν
{
ri−1
P 2i−1+Q
2
i−1
V 2i−1
}
. (4.6)
Moreover, the power loss minimization function would be subject to multiple nom-
inal operational constraints. We note that the active power Pi, determined by piL
and piG from Fig. 4.2, can be viewed as a fixed constant during the iterative process.
The DG’s reactive power term qiG will be treated as the control variable to optimize
the objective function. The constraint formulas for all nodes are as follows
s.t. ∀ i ∈ 1, ..., ν
| Qi −Qi−1 − qiL |≤ si (4.7a)
V mini ≤ Vi ≤ V maxi (4.7b)
V 2i = V
2
i−1 − 2(ri−1Pi−1 + xi−1Qi−1) + (r2i−1 + x2i−1)
P 2i−1 +Q
2
i−1
V 2i−1
(4.7c)
| Si−1 |≤ Smaxi−1 . (4.7d)
where (2a) is the power balance constraints for each node, si is the inverter’s maxi-
mum apparent power capacity of DG for node i [116]. (2b) is the node voltage level
constraints. V mini , V
max
i are the minimum and maximum voltage magnitude for each
node i, respectively. We set voltage threshold value to 0.05 (where V mini = 0.95,
V maxi = 1.05) according to the American National Standard ANSI C84.1-2011. (2c)
is the voltage constraints between two adjacent nodes i− 1 and i. ri−1 and xi−1 are
the branch resistance and reactance from node i− 1 to node i, respectively. (2d) is
the transmission line capacity constraints, and Smaxi−1 denotes the maximum limited
apparent power of transmission line branch from node i− 1 to i.
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4.2.3 Linearisation of Objective Functions
The above objective function is a nonlinear programming problem. Under normal
circumstances, the changes in voltage from node to node are relatively smaller than
the normal voltage level and the power loss of active and reactive power are also
smaller than the power flows from node to node. Therefore, equations (4.6) and
(4.7) can be rewritten within a linear quadratic function with linear constraints.
The individual generic power loss expression with constraints for each node i (power
loss branch from node i− 1 to node i) can be given by
Fi = ri−1
P 2i−1 +Q
2
i−1
V 21
(4.8a)
| Qi −Qi−1 − qiL |≤ si (4.8b)
V mini ≤ Vi ≤ V maxi (4.8c)
V
′
i = V
′
i−1 − 2(ri−1Pi−1 + xi−1Qi−1) (4.8d)
| Si−1 |≤ Smaxi−1 (4.8e)
where Fi in (4.8a) is the power loss formula from node i− 1 to node i. We assume
that the Vi−1 ≈ V1. V ′i = V 2i . Then, the objective function can be approximated as
a linear quadratic function.
The LinDistFlow model (A linear branch flow model to model a radial distribution
system) is well justified for a wide range of distribution circuits [117]. The observa-
tion in [117] is powerful because the LinDistFlow equations (4.8) is convex, which is
a linear quadratic function with linear constraints. Convexity shows that this opti-
mization problem can be solved efficiently. In this centralized optimization strategy,
each node can communicate with a control center, which performs the computations
and distributes the optimal variables to all nodes. By contrast, we will develop a
decentralized optimization method, which can solve the objective function (4.8) only
by exchanging the iterative messages between neighbouring nodes in the network.
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4.3 Methodology
In this section, we will adopt a distributed ADMM algorithm to optimize the glob-
al power loss problem. A distributed ADMM method does not need any control
center to gather the information to run the iteration steps. Without the control
center, the algorithm can significantly reduce the optimization time. In addition,
the communication delay model will be considered in the ADMM algorithm.
4.3.1 ADMM Consensus Distributed Algorithm
To solve (4.6) in a decentralized way, we propose to use the ADMM algorith-
m [25, 118]. In this algorithm, we rewrite the global objective function to a dis-
tributed consensus problem. Hence, each node has its own local objective function
and local constraints associated with neighbouring nodes’ variables, which can be
easily handled as a decentralized problem. Moreover, information exchange with
neighbouring nodes means all nodes are relatively interrelated. As (4.7a)-(4.7d) are
the global variables, we take into account the local variables for each local function.
Partial local variables are also equivalent to the global variables after each iteration.
Let Xi = {Qi, Q+i , yi, y+i } be the optimization variables of node i, H(Xi) ≤ 0 is the
inequality constraints and E(Xi) = 0 is the equality constraints, which are equal to
constraints (4.7a)-(4.7d). The augmented Lagrangian expression can be defined as
follows
Lρ =
ν∑
i=1
Li(Xi) (4.9)
where the detail of the individual augmented Lagrangian formula Li(Xi) for node i
can be given as
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Li(Xi) =
power loss term︷ ︸︸ ︷
Fi(Qi) +
reactive power term︷ ︸︸ ︷
yi(Qi −Qi−1) + y+i (Q
+
i −Qi)
+
ADMM penalty term︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ
2
(‖ Qi −Qi−1 ‖22 + ‖ Q+i −Qi ‖22)
(4.10)
where Qi is the local variable of reactive power flow from node i− 1 to i and Q+i is
the local variable of reactive power flow from node i to i + 1. Qi−1 and Qi are the
global reactive power flow from node i− 1 to i and node i to i+ 1, respectively. yi,
y+i are the Lagrangian multipliers for node i. And ρ is the penalty factor.
The ADMM penalty term in the objective function with ρ
2
represent penalties for
the local variables being different from the global variables. This term does not
impact the optimal result because the constraints demand that the local variables
are equal to the global variables at the optimum. Note that (4.8b) is not included
in the augmented Lagrangian expression because the algorithm will be minimizing
Li(Xi) by adjusting the reactive power variables Qi within a feasible set (satisfy the
condition given by (4.8b)).
The ADMM distributed consensus algorithm is an iterative algorithm, where the
k+1th iteration starts with values Qi(k), Q
+
i (k), yi(k), y
+
i (k), vi(k) for each node i.
One iteration of the improved ADMM recursive algorithm will be written as follows:
1. Minimization step: For each individual node i, the following optimization
problem is solved by:
Xi(k + 1) := arg min
Xi(k)
{Li(Xi(k)) : H(Xi) ≤ 0, E(Xi) = 0} (4.11)
This minimization step is a convex optimization problem with two local vari-
ables Qi(k) and Q
+
i (k) and the constraints are also linear. The objective func-
tion can be solved analytically by evaluating the corresponding KarushKuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [119]. Given the fact that the expressions are bulky
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and we skip them here for sake of brevity. According to the consensus algo-
rithm, each objective function can be minimized independently because the
optimization process only uses the local variables at node i. The solution of
the minimization problem are denoted as Xi(k+1) which also means Qi(k+1)
and Q
+
i (k + 1).
2. Global variables update step: For each node i, the global reactive power vari-
able of node i will be updated associated with the neighbouring node’s local
variable Qi+1 of node i. The variable for each node is updated according to
the following rules:
Qi(k + 1) =
1
2
(Q
+
i (k + 1) +Qi+1(k + 1)) +
1
ζi
y+i (k) (4.12a)
Qn(k + 1) = 0, Q1(k + 1) = 0, Vn+1 = 0 (4.12b)
Since this update step contains the communication with neighbouring nodes.
The variable Qi+1(k + 1) comes from node i+ 1, which means the node i+ 1
will send the local Qi+1(k + 1) to node i if the minimization step of node
i + 1 completes. Then the new local variable Qi(k + 1), the average of local
variables in self-node and forward neighbouring nodes, will be obtained and
send to backward neighbouring nodes for initializing next iteration.
3. Lagrangian multipliers update step: The local Lagrangian multipliers will be
stored by each node independently. The update rules for each node are the
following:
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + ρ(Qi(k + 1)−Qi−1(k)) (4.13a)
y+i (k + 1) = y
+
i (k) + ρ(Q
+
i (k + 1)−Qi(k)) (4.13b)
All variables in this step have been communicated in the global variables up-
date step. And the updated Lagrangian multipliers will be stored and prepared
for next iteration.
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The ADMM algorithm always requires information exchange to update the local
variables between the neighbouring nodes. These local variables can influence each
other and finally get the optimal feasible solution. The actual values of reactive
power injection/absorption by local inverter can be obtained by each node from the
global variables
qiG = Qi −Qi−1 + qiL (4.14)
It should be noted that qiG will be within the allowed range given by the si in
(4.8b). In addition, the addition of a communication system will inevitably impact
the algorithm, for example by introducing a message delay or packet loss for an
uncertain period of time. To analyze the effect of the communication time-delay
model on the performance of the iterative results, we will develop a stochastic end-
to-end time-delay model primarily.
4.3.2 Stochastic Time Delay Model in ADMM algorithm
4.3.2.1 Communication Delay Model
The components of the end-to-end delay can be divided into four categories: pro-
cessing delay, transmission delay, propagation delay and queueing delay. From a
measurement point of view, this end-to-end delay over a fixed path mainly consists
of two components: a deterministic delay Dd and a stochastic delay Ds [54]. The
deterministic delay is mainly caused by the physical delay (fixed part of the pro-
cessing delay generated by the all routers). This delay Dd can be approximated by
a probability density of the normal distribution,
ϕ1(t) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 (4.15)
where µ and σ are the mean value and standard deviation value, respectively. The
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mean value µ is larger than the minimum processing delay.
The random part of the processing delay is typically a stochastic value because it
is not precisely the same for each probe-packet in the router. In [56], an extensive
research was found to assess the distributions of on-period and off-period for Internet
traffic between fixed source and destination pairs. There are three parametric models
for the stochastic delay caused by Internet traffic, the exponential density model,
the Weibull density model and the Polynomial (Pareto-like) density model. In this
chapter, the exponential density model is adopted to analyze the stochastic delay
Ds caused by the router processing delay and by interfering Internet traffic which
originates from one alternating renewal process [22]. Hence
ϕ2(t) = λe
−λt (4.16)
where λ−1 models the mean length of the closure periods which correspond to the pe-
riods where the Internet traffic has an open period. The open period in the Internet
traffic is the period during which the probe-packet is blocked. The independent sum
of the deterministic delay and the stochastic delay has probability density function
(PDF) [22]
ϕ(t) = pϕ1(t) + qϕ1(t) ∗ ϕ2(t), t ≥ 0 (4.17)
where p + q = 1 and ϕ1(t) ∗ ϕ2(t) =
∫ t
0
ϕ1(u)ϕ2(t − u)du. In terms of (4.15) and
(4.16), the PDF (4.17) can be rewritten as
ϕ(t) =
p
σ
√
2pi
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 +
qλ
σ
√
2pi
e−λt
∫ t
0
eλu−
(u−µ)2
2σ2 du (4.18)
In order to calculate the time-delay probability of each communication for all nodes,
the PDF (4.18) will be recalculated to derive the Cumulative Distribution Function
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(CDF) of time delay model as [22]
P (t) =
∫ t
0
ϕ(u)du
=
1
2
{erf( µ√
2σ
) + erf(
t− µ√
2σ
)}
+
p− 1
2
eη{erf(λσ
2 + µ√
2σ
) + erf(
t− λσ2 − µ√
2σ
)}
(4.19)
where η = 1
2
λ2σ2 + µλ − λt and erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
is the error function. The
relative parameters can be set as µ = 5.3ms, σ = 0.078, p = 0.580 and λ = 1.39.
Consequently, the probability density curve can be found in Fig. 4.3. The red
line is the probability density curve and the blue area is the probability density
histogram, which shows the probability density histogram is consistent with the
probability density curve. According to equation (4.19), we can obtain the different
probabilities of time-delay for each communication procedure which will be added
into the ADMM algorithm to analyze the performance.
Figure 4.3: The probability density curve of communication delay.
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4.3.2.2 Message Transmission Mechanism
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the decentralized OPF algorithm by ap-
plying the different probabilities of stochastic communication time-delay. In terms
of the ADMM algorithm and communication delay model, we present the message
transmission mechanism during the iterative procedure of the ADMM algorithm in
detail. According to equations (4.11) to (4.13) and Fig. 4.2, we summarize the
detailed iterative process for kth iteration as follow:
(Step 1) Each node i would minimize the individual objective function first
to achieve the updated local variables (Qi(k + 1), Q
+
i (k + 1), Vi(k + 1)) inde-
pendently by using the equation (4.11).
(Step 2) Node i will transmit the updated variable Qi(k + 1) to node i − 1
when the minimization step achieves the updated variables. For node i − 1,
the received variable Qi(k + 1) from node i can be defined as Qi+1(k + 1)
in (4.12a). Meanwhile, node i would receive the updated Qi+1(k + 1) from
node i + 1 when node i + 1 completes the computation of minimization step.
All the communications will begin immediately when the minimization step is
completed.
(Step 3) For node i, when the updated variables of neighbouring nodes are
received, the new global variable Qi(k+1) can be obtained by using (4.12a) and
the Lagrange multipliers yi(k + 1), y
+
i (k + 1) can be updated by rules (4.13)
immediately, which means that a full iteration calculation is accomplished.
However, we still need to transmit the global updated variables to neighbouring
nodes in order to begin the next iteration.
(Step 4) Node i sends updated global variable Qi(k+1) and Vi(k+1) to node
i + 1. At the same time, node i will receive the global variable Qi−1(k + 1)
and Vi−1(k + 1) from node i− 1 when node i− 1 completes the update step.
Then the iterative process will be repeated until the result satisfies a certain error
condition. The above communication mechanism shows that each node will exchange
the information with backward and forward neighbouring nodes for each iteration
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independently. Note that the backward links transmit the local variables Qi(k + 1)
to backward neighbouring nodes and the forward links transmit the update global
reactive power variable Qi(k + 1) and Vi(k + 1) to forward neighbouring nodes.
Although each iteration in the ADMM algorithm is decentralized, the proposed
algorithm can still obtain the optimal feasible solution through the limited internal
information exchange between neighbouring nodes.
Algorithm 1: Synchronous ADMM Algorithm
1: process for local node i, i ∈ 1, ..., ν
2: initialize local variables Xi(0), k=0.
3: repeat
4: update to obtain Xi(k + 1)
5: wait ≤ tdm
6: until all nodes complete the computation
7: transmit Qi(k + 1) to backward nodes
8: receive Qi+1(k + 1) from forward nodes
9: wait tds
10: until time reaches tds
11: update to obtain Qi(k + 1)
12: update to obtain yi(k + 1), y
+
i (k + 1)
13: wait ≤ tdu
14: until all nodes complete the computation
15: transmit Qi(k + 1) to forward nodes
16: receive Qi−1(k + 1) from backward nodes
17: wait tds
18: until time reaches tds
19: k=k+1
20: untill satisfied the defined minimum error
21: end process
According to the above description of the communication mechanism, it is easy to
find that each iteration will have a fixed periodic time if the computation time and
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communication time are fixed. However, if the communication time is stochastic,
the periodic time of each iteration will be always different for each node. When all
nodes in the algorithm start to update the variables at the same time, it is necessary
to discuss the synchronization issue here because the communication time of each
transmission is always different. In this chapter, both synchronous (synchronization
device installed) and asynchronous (no synchronization device installed) algorithms
are proposed to analyze the performance of ADMM algorithm. When each node
is equipped with an additional GPS synchronization interface, the synchronization
issue may be solved easily. Otherwise, the algorithm can rely on the internal clocks to
achieve the synchronization, but the effect is not as good as the GPS synchronization
[120]. On the other hand, without any synchronization device, the algorithm can
consider to utilize an asynchronous strategy to optimize the target. The details of
both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms will be discussed in the following.
The synchronous distributed ADMM algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1. In Fig.
4.4, we assume that the computation time tdm (t1 to t2) and tdu (t3 to t4) are
the constant values for all nodes. The red line is the backward link which means
each node will send messages to the backward neighbouring nodes and the pink
line is the forward link which means each node will send messages to the forward
neighbouring nodes as shown in Fig. 4.2. Fig. 4.4 (a) is the synchronous algorithm
timing diagram, where the maximum communication time in every iteration for
each node is locked by the threshold time tds (assume t2 to t3 equals t4 to t5). For
synchronous algorithm, each node will be equipped with an external synchronization
interface, like GPS, to keep each step have the same clock. Specifically, after the step
of minimization of objective function, each node must wait until all nodes receive
the updated local variable Qi+1(k + 1) from backward node before proceeding step
3. We assume that each node starts calculating tds when the minimization step or
update step is just completed. When the backward link communication time reaches
the threshold time tds, each node will update its own local variables by (4.12) and
(4.13) to obtain the new local variables and then send the new updated global
variables to forward nodes. When time reaches threshold time tds in the forward
link communication, each node will begin the next iterative procedure. This is the
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of synchronous and asynchronous distributed ADMM algo-
rithm. (a) Synchronous distributed ADMM algorithm; (b) Asynchronous distribut-
ed ADMM algorithm.
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detailed process of a complete iteration period for the synchronous algorithm.
Algorithm 2: Asynchronous ADMM Algorithm
1: process for local node i, i ∈ 1, ..., ν
2: initialize local variables Xi(0), k=0.
3: repeat
4: update to obtain Xi(k + 1)
5: transmit Qi(k + 1) to backward nodes
6: receive Qi+1(k + 1) from forward nodes
7: wait ≤ tda
8: until node i receives or time reaches tda
9: update to obtain Qi(k + 1)
10: update to obtain yi(k + 1), y
+
i (k + 1)
11: transmit Qi(k + 1) to forward nodes
12: receive Qi−1(k + 1) from backward nodes
13: wait ≤ tda
14: until node i receives or time reaches tda
15: k=k+1
16: untill satisfied the defined minimum error
17: end process
Compared with the synchronous algorithm, we also propose an asynchronous algo-
rithm in detail. In the Fig. 4.4 (b), the timing diagram of asynchronous algorithm
is presented in detail. We assume that each communication also has a bounded
maximum transmission time tda. In case of a larger delay or packet loss, the mes-
sage may lead the algorithm to remain in the status of receiving the message which
may endanger the algorithm convergence speed. However, it is obvious that we
can enlarge the tolerance of maximum transmission time to reduce the probability
of time-delay because the communication time-delay of each node will not affect
the iteration process of other nodes. According to equation (4.19), we assume the
time-delay probability of 0.1% as the bounded delay time tda for the asynchronous
algorithm. Each node i in this algorithm does not need to wait until all nodes have
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received the updated variable from the backward node before proceeding to the next
step. Every node can execute the update steps to obtain the new local variables
independently and immediately when it receives the message without considering
whether the other nodes have received the messages. Under these circumstances,
each node have no idle status and more iterations can be achieved by comparing to
the synchronous algorithm at the same time interval. However, it should be noted
that the communication message comes from neighbouring nodes, when node i s-
tarts calculating the communication time, neighbouring nodes sometimes may not
complete the last computation step due to the asynchronous nature of the algo-
rithm. It is possible that node i has not received any message from neighbouring
nodes (perhaps the message is still in transit due to late transmission) when the
communication time of node i reaches the threshold time tda. Then we propose to
update the variables by using the previous received message in order to keep the
algorithm running without extra waiting time. As shown in Fig. 4.4 (b), without
the limitation of synchronization problem, each node can update its own variables
more frequently. The outline of asynchronous algorithm is listed in Algorithm 2.
In Fig. 4.4, during the same time interval, all nodes in synchronous ADMM al-
gorithm just finish one iterative period, but some nodes in asynchronous ADMM
algorithm almost completes one and a half iterative period. It is obviously that
different nodes under different communication time-delay without extra waiting can
shorten the iteration period and increase the number of iterations. Consequent-
ly, the asynchronous algorithm can speed up the convergence rate faster than the
synchronous algorithm to obtain a high theoretical accuracy. The simulation results
demonstrate convergence speed for both algorithms and the details will be discussed
in result section. We also assume that each node can always receive the message
in time for synchronous and asynchronous algorithms without time-delay. If some
nodes do not receive the message from the backward node or the forward node
within threshold time, the message will be considered as a packet lost. Then other
improved measures will be taken to continue the next step.
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4.3.3 Convergence Analysis for Asynchronous ADMM Al-
gorithm
The convergence analysis of synchronous ADMM algorithm has been investigated
in [24,25,47,119]. In this section, the convergence behavior of asynchronous ADMM
algorithm will be studied. Some assumptions regarding the problem are made. Let
∇Fi be the gradient or subgradient of Fi in (4.8a). And we also define kτi as a
new sequence of node i, which implies that the gradient calculation may use old
parameters due to the delayed message or lost message. xi and xi are the global
and local variables for each node i, respectively. Then, the following assumptions
are listed.
Assumption 1: For each node i, the individual function gradient ∇Fi is Lipchitz
continuous, and there exists a constant Ki > 0, such that
‖ ∇Fi(xi(k + 1))−∇Fi(xi(k + 1)) ‖≤ Ki ‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖ (4.20)
In addition, X is a closed, convex and compact set. The power loss function Fi(xi)
is bounded from below over X .
Assumption 2: The total delays are bounded. For each node i, there exists finite
constant Ti such that k − kτi ≤ Ti for all k.
Assumption 3: For each node i, the stepsize ρi is chosen large enough such that:
αi = ρi − 2ρ+ 7Ki
ρ2i
Ki(Ti + 1)
2 −KiT 2i > 0 (4.21a)
βi = ρi − 7Ki > 0 (4.21b)
Assumption 1 is the standard in the context of non-convex optimization [121] and
is satisfied for most problems of interest. According to assumption 2, when xi is up-
dated in asynchronous algorithm, the parameter used to update the variables should
be the latest received parameter. The convergence of the asynchronous algorithm
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can be verified by the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose that assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Then we have the
following true for asynchronous algorithm.
(a) ‖ yi(k + 1)− yi(k) ‖22≤ K2i (Ti + 1)
Ti∑
κ=0
‖ x(k + 1− κ)− x(k − κ) ‖22
(b) The augmented Lagrangian is lower bounded and satisfies
L({xi(k)}; {xi(k)}, {yi(k)}) ≥ Plos −
ν∑
i=1
Ki
2
diam2(X ) > −∞ (4.22)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.1. Lemma 1(a) presents that
there exists certain finite k < ∞ such that the augmented Lagrangian values are
non-increasing after k iterations. Lemmas 1(b) presents that the Lagrangian is lower
bounded. Then, we achieve that the augmented Lagrangian function is convergent.
The subsequent theorem proves the final convergence result and other properties.
Theorem 1: (a) The iterates generated by the asynchronous algorithm converges if
the following is true
lim
k→∞
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k) ‖= 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.23a)
lim
k→∞
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k) ‖= 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.23b)
lim
k→∞
‖ yi(k + 1)− yi(k) ‖= 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.23c)
(b) For each node i at k iterations, certain sequences {{x∗i }, {x∗i }, {y∗i }} converges
to the set of stationary solution of (4.5) and satisfies
∇Fi(x∗i ) + y∗i = 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.24a)
x∗i = x
∗
i , i = 1, ..., ν (4.24b)
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.2. Note that it suffices to
show that asynchronous algorithm converges to a stationary solution of (4.6) which
is equivalent to (4.5). In other words, {x∗i } can be the solution of (4.5). It is
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emphasized that the asynchronous algorithm may not converge to a globally optimal
solution.
4.4 Performance Assessment of Improved Strate-
gies
In the previous subsection, we derived the mathematics and communication mecha-
nism of synchronous and asynchronous ADMM algorithms. When the communica-
tion time-delay is added to both algorithms, the convergence performance of both
algorithms will certainly be affected due to unreceived variables, for example, un-
stable results, low quality results and slow convergence. In this section, we will take
different improved measures to assess the effect of time-delay of both synchronous
and asynchronous algorithms for this OPF problem.
4.4.1 Strategy I-Skipping Strategy (SS)
In this strategy, we propose the skipping strategy that means if the communication
message is not delivered within the threshold time, the unreceived node will ignore
the delayed message and not update the local variables. Then the node will wait
until the successful communication of the next step (other parameters will use data
from last successful iteration). For every iteration, each node needs to obtain two
messages, the backward link message and the forward link message. Both messages
may have different degrees of influence on the iterative algorithm. Therefore, we
may set different communication threshold times that relatively important commu-
nication link can be distributed a high bandwidth to increase the probability of
receiving message. The simple expression for skipping strategy in (4.11)-(4.13) can
be written as:
Xis(k + 1) := arg min
Xis
{Lis(Xis) : H(Xis) ≤ 0, E(Xis) = 0} (4.25a)
Qis(k + 1) =
1
2
(Q
+
is(k + 1) +Qis+1(k + 1)) +
1
ζi
y+is(k) (4.25b)
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yis(k + 1) = yis(k) + ρ(Qis(k + 1)−Qis−1(k)) (4.25c)
where the subscript is means the set of nodes whose messages receive on time at
kth iteration. For the backward link delay, we will only update the variable of
the received node by using (4.25b) and skip unreceived nodes’ update step. For the
forward link delay, we plan to skip the update step for those nodes without receiving
updated global variable Qi−1. The variable update of other nodes will be calculated
in accordance with equations (4.25a) and (4.25c). The skipping strategy not only
reduces the update frequency of the algorithm, but also affects the neighbouring
nodes’ normal update of the algorithm due to the communication time-delay, which
may lead to unstable convergence of the system. Therefore, we propose the previous
value strategy, using the previous received message, to improve the convergence
performance.
4.4.2 Strategy II-Previous Value Strategy (PVS)
The previous value strategy replaces the delayed or lost message by using the saved
variables from the last successful communication. Each node can install a storage
device to save the data generated from the previous normal iteration. When the
communication delay occurs, the stored information can be invoked instead of the
variables that have not be received within the threshold time. The update equations
(4.11)-(4.13) can be modified as
Xip(k + 1) := arg min
Xip
{Lip(Xip) : H(Xip) ≤ 0, E(Xip) = 0} (4.26a)
Qip(k + 1) =
1
2
(Q
+
ip(k + 1) +Qip+1(k)) +
1
ζi
y+ip(k) (4.26b)
yip(k + 1) = yip(k) + ρ(Qip(k + 1)−Qip−1(k − 1)) (4.26c)
where the subscript ip is the set of nodes whose messages do not arrive on time as kth
iteration. The variable update of unreceived nodes will exploit (4.26a)-(4.26c) and
other nodes’ variable update still follows equations (4.11)-(4.13). When time-delay
happens in the forward link, the global reactive power variable Qi−1 in (4.26a) also
will take advantage of the previous saved variables. This strategy may also decrease
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the convergence rate because the partial iterative processes using previous data
without updated new variables may slow down the update speed of both self-node
and neighbouring nodes in theory. For a real distribution network, this strategy is
more suitable for certain scenarios that are prone to transmission delay or packet loss
while the requirement of optimization accuracy is not very stringent. It is necessary
to propose other measures to speed up the convergence rate. Therefore, we propose
to use the predict value by autoregressive (AR) strategy to replace the message that
does not arrive on time.
4.4.3 Strategy III-AR Strategy (ARS)
When the time reaches the threshold tds in the iterative process, if some nodes have
not received any message from neighbouring nodes, we can use the predicted value
in advance instead of the previous saved message in the previous value strategy.
Estimating the correlation between past and present data is one of the effective ap-
proaches to understanding the behaviour of time series data. The predicted value
can be closer to the original value than the previous saved value. Forecast can begin
when the communication message was received in the last successful communica-
tion. The forecast can be made during the computation time and communication
waiting time, which do not need extra forecasting time to predict the unreceived
message. In order to understand the principle, this subsection will first provide the
fundamental level of the theory and conceptual framework of the AR model to ap-
ply into the ADMM algorithm. Suppose the relationship between past successfully
received messages and current unreceived message can be estimated using previous
saved data. The general AR model AR(ω) of order ω is defined as [122]
at = c+
ω∑
i=1
φiat−i + t
= c+ φ1at−1 + φ2at−2 + ...+ φωat−ω + t
(4.27)
where ω is the order of the AR model and φ1, ..., φω are the autoregressive coefficient
which are constant parameters for the model, c is also the fixed value and t is the
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stochastic parameter that we define as white noise, t ∼ T (0, σ2). In addition,
a1, a2, ..., aT are the previous values of time series data used to predict the current
value. According to the autoregressive coefficient, the likelihood function of the AR
model can be written as
pl(φ, σ
2) =
T∏
t=1
1√
2piσ2
exp{− 1
2σ2
(at −
ω∑
i=1
φiat−i)2} (4.28)
where the parameters of AR model can be obtained by using the Yule-Walker equa-
tions [123]. Taking a derivative of the logarithm of formula (4.28) by
− 1
σ2
T∑
t=1
(at −
ω∑
l=1
φlat−l)at−i = 0
T∑
t−1
ω∑
l=1
φlat−lat−i =
T∑
t−1
atat−i
(4.29)
where
T∑
t=1
at−lat−i is taken to be autocoveriance C|i−l|.
Similarly, the derivative of each parameters φ1, φ2, ..., φω gives:

C0 C1 · · · Cω−1
C1 C0 · · · Cω−2
...
...
. . .
...
Cω−1 Cω−2 · · · C0


φ1
φ2
...
φω
 =

C1
C2
...
Cω
 (4.30)
All the autoregressive coefficients of the AR model can be obtained by the simulta-
neous formula in (4.30). The variance σ2 can be written as:
σ2 =
1
T + ω
T∑
t=1
(at −
ω∑
i=1
φiat−i)2 (4.31)
The performance of autoregressive model is depended on the order. Next, the de-
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termination of the AR model order will be discussed. Decreasing the order against
the time series data reduces the estimation performance of the AR model. How-
ever, increasing the order leads to more complex behavior and even fails to obtain
appropriate estimations. This paper adapts the Akaike-Information-Criterion(AIC)
as the evaluation function of the AR model to balance the size of order. The evalu-
ation function of the AR model can be calculated as [124] by φi yields the following
expression:
AIC = −2
T∑
t=1
ln{p(at | φ, σ2)}+ 2ω. (4.32)
where ω is the order of the AR model and the value of ω can be chosen from the
order index 1,2,3...,ω. The evaluation function from AIC will be applied to the
AR strategy to emulate the algorithm. If the node i do not receive the message
from neighbouring nodes within a threshold value, the algorithm will adopt the
predictive values to replace the unreceived Q
+
i+1(k + 1) and Qi−1(k + 1) in (4.11)-
(4.13), respectively.
Xia(k + 1) := arg min
Xia
{Lia(Xia) : H(Xia) ≤ 0, E(Xia) = 0} (4.33a)
Qia(k + 1) =
1
2
(Q
+
ia(k + 1) + aia+1(k)) +
1
ζi
y+ia(k) (4.33b)
yia(k + 1) = yia(k) + ρ(Qia(k + 1)− aia−1(k)) (4.33c)
where the subscript ia is the set of nodes whose message do not arrive on time.
aia−1(k) is the replacement value of the unreceived parameter Qia−1(k) in Mini-
mization step (4.11) and update step and (4.13), respectively. (4.33b) also use the
predictive value aia+1(k) instead of unreceived data Q
+
ia+1(k+ 1) in (4.12) if the de-
lay happens. Other nodes will continue to follow the original formulas (4.11)-(4.13)
to update the variables. For brevity, we have not included the detail of the AR
derivation process.
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4.4.4 Strategy VI-Weighted AR Strategy (WARS)
The estimated value from AR strategy exists certain fluctuations and errors during
the prediction. Therefore, we propose to add a weighted term into the ADMM al-
gorithm to reduce the error caused by the prediction to improve the convergence
results. The node update expression in (4.11)-(4.13) for kth iteration can be rewrit-
ten as
Xiw(k + 1) := arg min
Xiw
{Liw(Xiw) : H(Xiw) ≤ 0, E(Xiw) = 0} (4.34a)
Qiw(k + 1) =
1
2
(Q
+
iw(k + 1) + (1 + γi)aiw+1(k)) +
1
ζi
y+iw(k) (4.34b)
yiw(k + 1) = yiw(k) + ρ(Qiw(k + 1)− (1 + γi)aiw−1(k)) (4.34c)
where the subscript iw is the set of nodes whose message do not arrive on time. γi,
γi are the weighted factors. The weighted terms γiaiw−1(k) and γiaiw+1(k) are added
to execute the iterative steps in (4.34) if delay happens. Other nodes will continue
to use the original expression to update the variables. These weighted factors can
improve the fluctuation caused by the uncertainty of the packet loss and predictive
error and also optimize the predictive variables to obtain a better convergence result.
The improved weighted AR iterative steps will enable the predicted value to be closer
to the optimal value.
4.4.5 Connection between Weighted AR ADMM and Con-
ventional ADMM
Generally, ADMM algorithms can rapidly converge to a local optimal value and
slowly reach to the global optimal value [125]. In order to find the connection
between the conventional ADMM and the weighted AR ADMM, it is necessary
to observe the difference between two iterative steps. Reference [25] presents the
traditional ADMM iterative form for consensus minimization problem.
Xi(k + 1) := arg min
Xi
{Li(Xi) : H(Xi) ≤ 0, E(Xi) = 0} (4.35a)
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Q(k + 1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Qi(k + 1) +
1
ρ
yi(k)) (4.35b)
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + ρ(Qi(k + 1)−Q(k + 1)). (4.35c)
where ρ is the ADMM penalty factor and also stands for the particular step size.
Such a conventional ADMM algorithm follows normalise routine. The details of the
routine are reported in [25]. The objective function for node i contains the variables
of adjacent nodes j in Ni. Therefore, the local variables for each individual formula
require the information exchange with neighbouring nodes.
Comparing (4.34) and (4.35), it is obviously that the traditional ADMM algo-
rithm is a particular case of the weighted AR ADMM by setting Qi(k + 1) =
Q
+
iw(k+1)+(1+γi)aiw+1(k)
2
, Qi(k + 1) = (1 + γi)aiw−1(k) and 1ρ =
1
ζi
. The same coef-
ficient 1
ρ
is set to all consensus constraints in the conventional ADMM. Contrarily,
the weighted AR ADMM assign the different coefficient 1
ζi
instead of the same coef-
ficient 1
ρ
in the conventional ADMM algorithm. In addition, the proposed weighted
AR ADMM adds different weighted terms γiaiw+1(k) and γiaiw−1(k) to each node
i because of the forecast error by the evaluation function, which could reduce the
volatility of convergence results theoretically.
These changes can make the weighted AR ADMM to achieve a better efficiency than
the traditional ADMM. To begin with, the traditional ADMM requires to informa-
tion exchange with all neighbouring nodes j in Ni for every communication that can
update the global variable Qi and the Lagrange multipliers yi of node i. Therefore,
the conventional ADMM requires a relative larger communication cost per iteration.
In contrast, the weighted AR ADMM is able to decrease the communication cost by
communicating with less neighbouring nodes, for example, backward link communi-
cation only communicates to backward nodes and forward link communication only
communicates to forward nodes. Furthermore, when communication delay happens,
the unreceived message not only affects the variable update of self-node, but also
affects the variable update of neighbouring nodes. Using predicted value in proposed
weighted AR ADMM can minimize the error caused by the delay or packet loss as
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much as possible compared that in the traditional ADMM. In addition, the adapted
weighted predictive value may produce a certain deviation from the original value
which can improve the results from a local optimization to a global optimization,
just like the crossover in genetic algorithms [126]. Finally, the conventional ADMM
can only optimize its convergence speed by adjusting the penalty factor ρ, since
other parameters are fixed. Whereas, the weighted AR ADMM has the flexibili-
ty by adjusting both weighted terms γiaiw+1(k), γiaiw−1(k) and coefficient term
1
ζi
.
Consequently, the weighted AR ADMM has the potential to obtain a relatively s-
maller fluctuation result and a faster and better convergence result than that in the
conventional ADMM.
Summing up, comparing to the conventional ADMM, the weighted AR ADMM
can not only reduce the volatility during the iterations, but also accelerate the
convergence speed to obtain a better optimization result. Therefore, this proposed
weighted AR ADMM can theoretically obtain a better target solution while time-
delay is considered. The similar analysis can be derived for other strategies, but we
skip them here for space limitations. In the following section, we demonstrate the
effectiveness through the numerical experiments.
4.5 Case Study Results
In order to verify the ADMM algorithm with communication, a 33-bus medium-
voltage DN in chapter 3 has been used as a case study. The detail of the data
can be found in [13]. This system is a 12.66 kV radial distribution network sys-
tem. It contains 33 buses and 32 branches and we propose to install four wind
DGs (2,12,15,18) and four solar DGs (23,25,27,33) in the network [127]. In the
experiments, both partial penetration (8 DGs) and full penetration (full DGs) are
discussed to perform the algorithms performance.
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4.5.1 Partial DGs Penetration Optimization
The simulation results are based on the 8 DGs penetration of the DN which means
only 8 DGs will regulate the reactive power to optimize the problem. The details
can be shown as follows.
4.5.1.1 Observation of General Convergence Speed
In this section, we consider to maximize the convergence speed of the proposed AD-
MM algorithm without communication time-delay. As we know, the applied ADMM
formula has two important parameters, the penalty factor ρ and the convergence
tolerance ε which could affect the convergence speed in the augmented Lagrangian
formula (4.10). Fig. 4.5 illustrates the general synchronous ADMM convergence
speed with different penalty factor value ρ for 8 DG network. We have decreased
the penalty factor ρ from 1 to 0.00001. The result of convergence speed is sensitive
to the value of ρ. The high values of ρ typically have a relatively slow convergence
speed and poor iterative results while the iterative results sometimes occur certain
fluctuations. The best choice of ρ which provide the fastest convergence speed for
this particular case is 0.001 in the early stage of the iteration process. Subsequently,
the convergence speed of ρ = 0.001 is slower than the speed of ρ = 0.0001 after 200
iterations. In other words, the minimization results of ρ = 0.0001 is better than
that of ρ = 0.001 after about 200 iterations. Intuitively the convergence speed is
mainly dependent on the interaction between the reactive power term and ADMM
penalty term in (4.10). In other different cases, sometimes a little higher or smaller
value of ρ may result in a slightly better convergence speed.
Fig. 4.5 also shows the different iterations for different tolerance values. For the
maximum error ε < 0.1 compared to conventional centralized OPF algorithm, the
ADMM only needs 9 iterations to reach the tolerance goal of less than 10%. How-
ever, after 200 iterations, the error is only less than 5%. Then about 400 iterations
later, the tolerance ε can reach 0.025. It is typically that the ADMM algorithm has
a faster convergence rate at the beginning of the iteration process, then the conver-
gence speed will come down dramatically. In some special cases, it also should be
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noted that setting a high tolerance value (e.g., ε = 0.1 ) may results in a relatively
large fluctuation at the beginning of the iteration process. It is necessary to set an
appropriate tolerance value for different cases. In this chapter, we set the tolerance
value as ε < 0.05 which could also help to choose the penalty factor ρ = 0.001 with
faster convergence rate. Summing up, the observations made in this subsection pro-
vide general guidelines to set up an appropriate parameter for similar optimization
case.
Figure 4.5: Illustration of convergence speed of distribution ADMM algorithm with
different values of penalty factor ρ for 8 DG network.
4.5.1.2 Performance of Synchronous algorithm
In this section, we apply the communication delay to synchronous iterative algo-
rithm to test the performance of the convergence results. According to equation
(4.19), we set the time delay probability as 10% which the threshold time value tds
can be calculated as 6.3363 ms. In the light of Fig. 4.2, each iteration requires
twice information exchange, the backward link and the forward link. Hence, we
divide communication into three different cases, the backward link case (only the
backward link considering time-delay), the forward link case (only the forward link
considering time-delay) and two-way link case (both links considering time-delay).
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of convergence speed and statistic results of three different
cases for synchronous skipping strategy.
4.5. Case Study Results 107
Table 4.1: Statistical Results with 1000 Runs for Each Approach
Synchronous
SS PVS ARS WARS
Mean 0.1287 0.1298 0.1283 0.1243
V ariance 1.16E − 5 7.12E − 7 3.16E − 7 6.20E − 8
Fig. 4.6 shows the effect of convergence speed and statistical results for different
delay types compared to no-delay case in Fig. 4.5. When time-delay happens, the
synchronous skipping strategy will be applied to deal with the update step of time-
delay node. The left side of Fig. 4.6 presents the fluctuated convergence results
in three cases under a fixed probability of time-delay. For the backward link, the
optimization results always have a larger fluctuation during the iterations because
the time-delay happens during the iterative process. For the forward link, the op-
timization results fluctuate less compared to the results of the backward link. On
the other hand, two-way link case has the largest fluctuation because of the com-
bination of backward link and forward link. The time-delay in backward link and
two-way link both affect the update of global reactive power parameter in (4.12)
which would significantly influence global reactive power update of both self-node
and other neighbouring nodes of whole three terms in the augmented Lagrangian
formulation (4.10). However, the forward link only affect the local reactive power
variable of neighbouring nodes in (4.10). The right side of Fig. 4.6 demonstrates
the statistical results for three cases (1000 stochastic time-delay runs each). The
maximum fluctuation range is 0.1218 to 0.1474 (21.33% fluctuation) in backward
link case, 0.1221 to 0.1355 (11.17% fluctuation) in forward link and 0.1214 to 0.1485
(22.58% fluctuation) in two-way link. Overall the results indicate that the conver-
gence speed mainly depend more on the communication of step 2 in Fig. 4.4(a).
When investigating the communication application for ADMM in such system, the
bandwidth allocation should be studied to reduce the probability of packet loss dur-
ing the backward link communication. From the results of these three cases, the
synchronous skipping strategy cannot solve the fluctuations caused by the delay.
We next test the performance using previous value strategy. From this strategy,
we only test the two-way link case as the space limitations. Fig. 4.7 shows the
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of convergence speed of synchronous no-delay case and
synchronous Previous value strategy.
general optimization results of previous value strategy (100 stochastic time-delay
runs) compared to the result of the no-delay case. It is clear that the results of
using previous value strategy dramatically reduce the fluctuation range compared
to the simulation results of skipping strategy in Fig. 4.6. In the early stages from 8
to 20 iterations, the convergence results appears to rise and one of the cases even rise
to 0.1395 p.u.. Furthermore, the optimization result after 200 iterations still does not
converge to a desirable value which only decreases to near 0.13 p.u.. The maximum
8.98% error after 200 iterations could be very inefficient for the ADMM algorithm.
Therefore we have demonstrated that the proposed previous value strategy could
only improve the fluctuation performance, but cannot speed up the convergence
rate.
However, it should be noted that warm-starting the ADMM algorithm (e.g. forecast
in advance) can be utilized to improve both the fluctuation in the skipping strat-
egy and the convergence speed in the previous value strategy. In this subsection,
the synchronous AR strategy is proposed to estimate the unreceived parameters
which has a better simulation result compared with the previous value strategy. As
shown in Fig. 4.8, we choose one typical fixed time-delay case to compare different
synchronous strategies. The AR strategy speed up the convergence rate over the
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of convergence speed: Comparison of different synchroniza-
tion strategies.
Figure 4.9: Comparison of convergence speed: Comparison of AR strategy and
Weighted AR strategy (100 stochastic time-delay runs each).
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previous value strategy but still has a large fluctuation because of the forecasting
error. However, the good result is that this fluctuation is not very large compared
to the synchronous no-delay case and the convergence result is also improved com-
pared to the previous value strategy. The predictive parameter sometimes has a
slight error fluctuation, we consider to modify the predictive values to decrease the
estimation error to optimize the simulation results. Then the weighted AR strategy
is proposed to improve the result of AR strategy. In Table 4.1, the peculiarity of
weighted AR strategy with an appropriate weighted parameter, which the AR strat-
egy do not modify the predictive value, is that due to a slight improvement of the
predictive value there is an increased convergence speed, decreased fluctuation range
and even significantly better optimization result than the result in the synchronous
no-delay case. In Fig. 4.9, we also simulate 100 stochastic time-delay runs for each
AR and weighted AR strategy. The modified global reactive power and Lagrangian
multipliers can be more in line with the optimal values. At the beginning of the re-
sult between 10 to 30 iterations, the fluctuation range can be up to 12.5%. However,
the results after 100 iterations only have a slight fluctuation and the final results
at 200 iterations only have 1.0% fluctuation range. The original update parameters
also have uncertainty in the early stage of iterative process, the AR prediction can-
not be able to achieve an accurate value appropriately. The AR prediction values
have better iteration results after 100 iterations because of the more predictable
original update parameters. Comparing with the results 0.1258 p.u. of synchronous
case without delay, the weighted AR strategy even can converge to mean 0.1243
p.u. which dramatically improve the local optimization result of the normal ADMM
algorithm without delay.
It is well-know that the aggregators will be the fundamental part in the future smart
grid [128]. The decentralized power system optimization scheme can really have a
significant effect on the convergence rate in real-time OPF scheme. A distribution
generator combined with distribution network aggregator could be a essential frame-
work for smart grid in the future. As it is, our simulation results in synchronous
weighted AR strategy with communication delay demonstrate that it is an efficient
control strategy from a synchronous distributed optimization perspective.
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Table 4.2: Statistical Results with 1000 Runs for Each Approach
Asynchronous
SS PVS ARS WARS
Mean 0.1239 0.1238 0.1237 0.1227
V ariance 4.96E − 7 2.16E − 7 1.15E − 7 1.73E − 7
4.5.1.3 Performance of Asynchronous Algorithm
In this section, we proposed to apply the communication delay to an asynchronous
ADMM algorithm. In this algorithm, we set 9.6146 ms (0.1% probability happen-
s time-delay) as the bounded time delay threshold tda for asynchronous algorithm
which is larger than the threshold time 6.3363 ms in the synchronous strategy. Each
node can update parameters using (4.11)-(4.13) without requirement of any syn-
chronization devices. Under this circumstance, Fig. 4.10 demonstrates the iteration
results of the proposed different asynchronous strategies compared to the results of
synchronous strategy without delay case. The result is based on the wall clock time
because the asynchronous algorithm do not require a synchronization device to wait
in the process and have no specific iterative number. Although the asynchronous
strategy has a much larger time-delay tolerance, the result in asynchronous strategy
without delay still has a much better convergence speed and optimization result
which can achieve 0.1231 p.u. compared to the 0.1258 p.u. in synchronous no-delay
case at the same time interval. On the other hand, the synchronous strategy requires
1260ms to achieve 0.1258 p.u. of optimization result. However, the asynchronous
strategy only needs 300ms to reach the same result, which means it is four times
faster than the synchronous strategy. It also means we can decrease the ICT re-
quirement of communication for asynchronous algorithm to achieve the results with
same error tolerance if it is necessary. The increased convergence speed by the asyn-
chronous algorithm mainly comes from the increasing number of the iterations and
the reduction of the waiting time in the iterations.
In Fig. 4.11, the enlarged convergence performance in asynchronous algorithm with
time-delay are displayed. The results of asynchronous skipping strategy show that
the time-delay also brings a slight influence on the stability of the convergence per-
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of synchronous no-delay case and different asynchronous
strategies.
Figure 4.11: Enlarged convergence performance in asynchronous strategies.
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formance even if the time-delay probability is only 0.1%, which indicates that the
very low time-delay can induce a relative fluctuation in such an asynchronous al-
gorithm. According to Table 4.2, the result of asynchronous weighted AR strategy
utilizing the same time-delay probability presents that the optimization result can
be improved to mean value with 0.1227 p.u. after 1000 runs. Meanwhile, the fluctu-
ation performance can be improved effectively. In Table 4.2, we run 1000 simulations
for each strategy. It should be noted that the asynchronous weighted AR strategy
has a small fluctuation compared to the asynchronous skipping strategy. The un-
certainty of the time-delay may reduce the predictability of the unreceived variables
in the algorithm. The proposed weighted AR strategy can improve the optimization
results, and also improve the accuracy of the forecast to reduce the fluctuation re-
sults. Relevant investigation of modified AR strategy with more accurate predictive
value could be a new research direction in future.
4.5.2 Full DGs Penetration Optimization
The above simulation results are base on the partial DGs penetration (8 DGs). In
this section, the results of full DGs penetration will be discussed.
Figure 4.12: Illustration of convergence speed of distribution ADMM algorithm with
different values of penalty factor ρ.
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4.5.2.1 Observation of General Convergence Speed
As we know, the penalty factor ρ can affect the convergence speed in partial DGs
penetration network. In this section, we also perform the different penalty factors
to simulate the convergence speed. Fig. 4.12 shows the observation of convergence
speed of full DGs penetration with different penalty factor ρ. The penalty factor ρ
is tested from 0.1 to 0.000001. The best result of the convergence speed in this case
is different from the result in 8 DGs case. It is obvious that when the penalty factor
ρ = 0.000001, the iterative result has the fastest convergence speed. The full DGs
penetration case has the different best penalty factor compared to the partial DGs
penetration case. Meanwhile, the full DGs case has the faster convergence speed
than the 8 DGs case, the result reaches the minimum value only after 5 iterations.
Figure 4.13: Comparison of convergence speed: Comparison of synchronous no-delay
case and different synchronous strategies.
4.5.2.2 Performance of Synchronous Algorithm
According to the equation (4.19), we still set the time-delay probability as 10%.
As depicts in Fig. 4.13, it presents different convergence results for no-delay case
and different improved synchronous strategies under a fixed time-delay scenario.
The simulation results show that the convergence speed does not change too much,
which even can not distinguish their differences. Only when we enlarge the y-axial
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from 0.117 p.u. to 0.1176 p.u., the results can be clearly distinguished. It shows
when the time-delay is considered in full DGs penetration case, the results still have
a larger fluctuation during the iterations comparing to other strategies. However,
the fluctuation range is relatively smaller than the partial DGs penetration case, s-
ince the number of affected DGs in the full DGs penetration case (only affect 10% of
the DGs) is small compared to the number of affected DGs in the partial DGs pen-
etration case (affect more than 10% of the DGs). Whereas, when the synchronous
previous value strategy is applied, it is clear that the results dramatically reduce the
fluctuation range compared to the results of skipping strategy in Fig. 4.13. Com-
pared with the result in no-delay case, both synchronous skipping and previous value
strategies have a better convergence result after 200 iterations. Consequently, the
proposed previous value strategy could only improved the fluctuation performance,
but cannot speed up the convergence rate.
When the synchronous AR strategy is considered to estimate the unreceived pa-
rameters, the result with improved fluctuation range has a better convergence speed
compared to the result in synchronous skipping strategy. It is obvious that the
proposed AR strategy is an effective way to reduce the fluctuation range and also
improve the convergence result when the time-delay is considered in the ADMM
algorithm. Then we also consider to modify the predictive values to reduce the es-
timation error to optimize the simulation results. The result with green line can be
found in Fig. 4.13. The simulation results of weighted AR strategy show that the
the added weighted term can slightly improve the convergence results from 0.11715
p.u. to 0.11708 p.u.. As it is, our simulation results in synchronous weighted AR
strategy demonstrate that it is also an efficient strategy in the full DGs penetration
case.
4.5.2.3 Performance of Asynchronous Algorithm
The asynchronous ADMM algorithm with full DGs penetration is discussed in this
section. The time-delay tolerance is much larger than that in the synchronous algo-
rithm. When time-delay is considered in this asynchronous algorithm, the simulation
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Figure 4.14: Comparison of convergence speed: Comparison of different asyn-
chronous strategies.
results in Fig. 4.14 show that the skipping strategy can cause a larger fluctuation
than the result in synchronous algorithm even if the time-delay probability is only
0.1%. It should be noted that the time-delay is more sensitive to the asynchronous
algorithm than the synchronous algorithm. When the previous value strategy is
adopted, the performance of fluctuation can be improved significantly. Whereas,
the convergence result, which is 0.124 p.u., is still lager than the result in asyn-
chronous no delay case. Hence, we propose to use the AR strategy to decrease the
estimate error to improve the convergence result.
According to the simulation results in Fig 4.14, the convergence result under AR
strategy can dramatically improved compared to the result of the skipping strategy.
After 700ms, the simulation results will be better than the asynchronous algorithm
without time-delay. The result of the experiment still has certain fluctuations, but
it is too small to negligible. The result of asynchronous weighted AR strategy using
the same time-delay probability scenario presents that the optimization result can
be improved to 0.1171 p.u. which is better than any other strategies.
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4.5.3 Performance of Loss Communication
The above simulation is based on the practical communication system which is low
probability of communication delay. However, in case some nodes’ communication
devices are out of work, the normal convergence rate will have large fluctuation
even if the probability of communication delay is low. The simulation results in
Fig. 7 show the convergence results of different strategies both in synchronous
and asynchronous algorithms. In this case, we assume that these nodes (node 15,
18, 23, 25) are out of work. Fig. 7(a) presents that the proposed WARS can
effectively reduce the fluctuation of experimental results. In addition, the statistical
results in Table II show that the mean value can be reduce to 0.1260 MW and
the variance value is the smallest among the synchronous strategies. Comparing
with the synchronous algorithm, the asynchronous algorithms can not only improve
the mean value from 0.1260 MW to 0.1230 MW, but also demonstrate the lowest
fluctuation of experimental results in Fig. 7(b) and Table II.
Figure 4.15: The convergence results for loss communication case.
4.5.4 Performance of 118-node System
We have expand an extra analysis in IEEE 118-node system. The results are based
on the partial DGs penetration (25%). The proposed WARS can effectively improve
the fluctuation in both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms and improve the
convergence results. The simulation results are presented in Figure 4.16 and the
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Table 4.3: Statistical results with 1000 runs for each strategies of loss communication
case
Mean Variance
Syn-Skipping Strategy 0.1289 7.11E-6
Syn-Previous Value Strategy 0.1308 2.30E-5
Syn-AR Strategy 0.1299 1.53E-5
Syn-Weighted AR Strategy 0.1260 8.85E-6
Asyn-Skipping Strategy 0.1237 5.52E-6
Asyn-Previous Value Strategy 0.1250 1.02E-7
Asyn-AR Strategy 0.1231 5.16E-7
Asyn-Weighted AR Strategy 0.1230 6.62E-7
statistic results are listed in Table 4.4.
Figure 4.16: The convergence results for IEEE 118-node system.
4.6 Chapter Summary
The future power system will become more and more granular because of the in-
creased penetration of renewable generators, distributed storage and electric vehi-
cles. It is necessary to extend the current centralized operation and control strategies
to be decentralized. In this chapter, the investigation considered communication de-
lay model in reactive power OPF problem was studied. A parallel implementation of
a fully decentralized ADMM algorithm has been adopted to solve the problem. Both
synchronous and asynchronous algorithms combined with the communication model
in partial DGs penetration case and full DGs penetration case are used to analyze
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Table 4.4: Statistical results with 1000 runs of IEEE 118-node system
Mean Variance
Syn-Skipping Strategy 95.7956 4.5464
Syn-Previous Value Strategy 97.3927 0.0300
Syn-AR Strategy 95.2740 0.7273
Syn-Weighted AR Strategy 91.4291 0.2382
Asyn-Skipping Strategy 94.3714 11.8582
Asyn-Previous Value Strategy 92.5414 0.2140
Asyn-AR Strategy 93.2303 8.9628
Asyn-Weighted AR Strategy 89.2774 0.9600
the convergence results which have a large effect of the convergence rate compared
with the no-delay algorithm. Extensive weighted AR strategy simulations showed
that the fluctuation performance during the communication can be improved sig-
nificantly in both algorithms. The optimization results also have been improved
compared with the results of no-delay case for both synchronous and asynchronous
algorithms.
Summing up the results, the convergence speed is largely dependent on the suitable
value of the penalty factor and the tolerance. When time-delay is applied into the
decentralized ADMM algorithm, the convergence performance would be significant-
ly affected with a dramatical fluctuation. The proposed weighted AR strategy can
largely reduce the fluctuation of the results in algorithm, and can also effectively im-
prove the fluctuation in both algorithms although the unpredictability happened in
both synchronous and asynchronous algorithms in DGs penetration case. Further-
more, both algorithms with weighted AR strategy can improve the iterative steps
to achieve a better optimization result for no-delay cases.
It should be noted that this chapter is a first step to developing the communica-
tion model into the decentralized problem for power system and further research is
necessary. Developing a more accurate communication, proposing novel and more
effective strategy in asynchronous strategy in different DGs penetration case and
investigating the cyber-attack would be very meaningful for future work.
Chapter 5
Cyber-attack in Voltage Control
and ADMM Algorithm
5.1 Introduction
In the previous century, electrical power systems have evolved into the largest Cyber-
physical (CP) network because of the emerging smart grid which integrates the power
and energy systems with information and communication systems. In chapter 4, the
optimization results can be obtained by a bi-direction communication link between
neighbouring nodes. The secure and reliable communication through iterative al-
gorithm is critical for stablility and economic target in smart grid. Therefore, the
main purpose of this chapter is not only to analyze the effect of CP attack on the
algorithm, but also to take certain defensive measures against CP attack.
Traditionally, the fundamental state estimation is a core function that processes
the raw measurements of system topology and obtains accurate estimation of the
state variables dynamically in power systems. In this chapter, we focus on the
Time Delay (TD) attack and false data injection (FDI) attack scenarios which are
based on the neighbouring nodes’ information exchange without control center. The
traditional state estimation model cannot be used to analyze the CP attacks through
monitoring the measurement variations and state changes. We thus introduce a novel
neighbouring monitoring scheme to detect the TD and FDI attacks. The scheme can
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detect the attacks by monitoring the exchange information of neighbouring nodes.
There are two main contributions in this chapter:
1 We analyse two potential attack models, TD attack model and FDI attack
model, in a fully decentralized OPF algorithm based-on the ADMM method.
Both two attacks are discussed from the adversaries’ perspective and we pro-
vides possible malicious attacks to simulate the final power dispatch results.
The effects of both attacks are analyzed in this chapter. Since the attacks are
not based on state estimation outcome by the control center, the information
exchange will only be described between neighbouring nodes in this scenario.
2 The goal of the attack is to maximize system power loss and as a result the
normal OPF algorithm with time-delay consideration will not take actions to
alert the attacks. This chapter proposes a neighbouring estimate scheme to
identify the misbehaving messages by using the local information to minimize
the potential disruptions and damages. The weighted autoregressive (AR)
strategy is utilized to mitigate the effects of attacks on the performance of the
optimal results.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the CP
attacks model for the distributed OPF algorithm. The proposed defence mechanisms
for detection of attacks are discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 demonstrates the
effectiveness of the proposed method through simulations. Finally, the conclusions
are provided in section 5.5.
5.2 Analysis of Cyber-attack Model in Smart Grid
In this section, we will demonstrate how the information exchange between neigh-
bouring nodes could affect the final results of system power loss. In the previous
research in chapter 4, we proposed an ADMM algorithm based on information ex-
change between neighbouring nodes and the stochastic end-to-end communication
time-delay model is also applied to solve optimal power flow problems. The de-
tailed information exchange mechanisms between neighbouring nodes can be found
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in section 4.3.2.2. All the information exchange is based on the proposed ADMM
recursive algorithm in section 4.3.1. According to the simulation results in chapter
4, the optimization result is sensitive to the message delay or loss. As a consequence,
a malicious cyber attacker can take advantage of vulnerabilities to compromise the
distributed iterative algorithm. Two types of attack models, TD attack model and
FDI attack model, are then defined.
5.2.1 Time-delay (TD) Attack Model
The distributed OPF algorithm, based on the ADMM recursive algorithm, only
works under the assumption that all the nodes will only exchange the local informa-
tion between neighbouring nodes. The wide-area wireless communication network
can offer widespread access, moderate flexibility, wide coverage and low investmen-
t [62]. According to the previous work, it is clear that the time-delay or packet
loss can often occur during the communication between neighbouring nodes. Under
different environmental conditions, the wide-area wireless communication will have
different degrees of delay or packet loss. Therefore, the attacker can take advan-
tage of the stochastic probabilities of delay to induce the instability of optimization
results in the transmission system. It is reasonable to model a type of attack by in-
jecting time-delay during data transmission coming from telemeters measurements.
The injected time-delay can be added into different parts of a control network, e.g.,
the feedback line, the referenced signal and the control signal. Here the time-delay
attack in the wireless communication link is discussed during the distributed opti-
mization power flow process. A simple cyber attack model can be seen in Fig 5.1.
The attacker can attack the node by resending the control command after brief de-
lay or directly modifying the control command to affect the normal operation of the
algorithm. There are two time-delay attack models that will be discussed as follows.
Resend Time-delay (RTD) attack. TS and TS
′
donate the time stamping
for backward link and forward link communication, respectively. First of all, the
attacker will record the first message Qi(1) from the sender and send the message to
the receiver. Then the attacker will record and drop the second message Qi(2) from
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Figure 5.1: A simple cyber attack model between neighbouring nodes.
the sender. Subsequently, the attacker will send the first recorded message Qi(1)
to the neighbouring node instead of the second received message Qi(2) from the
sender. Furthermore, the attacker will send the second recorded messageQi(2) to the
receiver twice instead of the third message Qi(3) and the fourth Qi(4). Each message
will be recorded and sent twice for the purpose of time-delay. The attacker can
generalize the delay by sending one message twice within a certain delay (Normally
in two iteration periods). Detailed steps of RTD attack can be found in Table 5.1.
In the table, Commji means the backward link from bus j to bus i, and Commij
means the forward link from bus i to bus j. This attack does not need to modify
the packet before sending the message as it can be easily detected by the receiver.
Next we will discuss a RTD attack mode based on the time stamping.
Time Stamping RTD attack. When the time stamping is not modified during
the attack process, the resend packet can be easily detected by the time stamping
detector. Hence, the adversary need to reconstruct the packet and fix the time
stamping issue. If the adversary can decrypt the packet and reconstruct it with
the wrong information, then the time stamping issue in the RTD attack model can
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Table 5.1: The Scenario of The Resend TD Attack
Iteration Commij Commji
1 Qi(1), TS1 Qj(1), TS
′
1
2 Qi(1), TS1 Qj(1), TS
′
1
3 Qi(2), TS2 Qj(2), TS
′
2
4 Qi(2), TS2 Qj(2), TS
′
2
5 Qi(3), TS3 Qj(3), TS
′
3
...
...
...
be fixed. In this way, the time stamping detector cannot detect the time-delay
attack any more and the information will normally be accepted by the receiver.
The attacker can receive the first message from the neighbouring node and copy
the information in the buffer. Then, it can replace the information of the second
message with the information of the first message and reconstruct the packet to send
to neighbouring node. Then the controller will utilize the incorrect information to
optimize the results. The subsequent message for each iteration will modify the time
stamping issue in the same manner. Details about the steps of time stamping RTD
attack can be found in Table 5.2, where the time stamping issue can be fixed with
normal time stamping in each communication.
Table 5.2: The Scenario of The time stamping RTD Attack
Iteration Commij Commji
1 Qi(1), TS1 Qj(1), TS
′
1
2 Qi(1), TS2 Qj(1), TS
′
2
3 Qi(2), TS3 Qj(2), TS
′
3
4 Qi(2), TS4 Qj(2), TS
′
4
5 Qi(3), TS5 Qj(3), TS
′
5
...
...
...
5.2.2 False Data Injection (FDI) Attack Model
As shown in Fig. 5.1, an attacker may launch a false data injection attack by hacking
a few sensors to distort the exchange information or alter the correct information
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during the transmission in the wireless communication links.
In our previous study in chapter 4, all buses need to share the correct iterative
information with neighbouring nodes in distributed OPF algorithm. During the
iterative process, each node needs to know the updated variables of neighbouring
nodes to optimize the allocation of reactive power. However, the attacker may
exploit the vulnerability of the communication link and manipulate to send the
incorrect information to affect the final power loss result. The attack method of
the FDI attack at kth iteration is summarized in Table 5.3. It is assumed that the
false data injection only occurs during the backward communication links in each
iteration.
According to Table 5.3, it is obvious when the information during the backward
communication link is manipulated, all the data updates based on the incorrect
information will be incorrect. During the FDI attack, when the power balance is not
fulfilled, the distributed generator will inject/absorb the reactive power to balance
the power flow. As a consequence, the local distributed generator will be utilized
to change the normal reactive power flow due to the false control information sent
from the attacker. In this way, bus i will alter the optimal power flow and affect the
final result of system power loss.
This attack could be exploited for an economic and stable issue in a distributed
network. For example, a malicious attacker can manipulate the information and
send to distributed generators which will increase or reduce the local reactive power
output by controlling the electronic converter. In addition, this change will affect
the stability of the voltage level directly, deviate from optimality, and break down
in most cases.
Note: The colluding attack is not considered in this chapter. We assume that the
adversary will only attack isolated buses without any two neighbouring buses being
attacked at the same time. In addition, if the change amount of original data is too
large, this attack could be detected by the system operator with a high probability
because the system operator can detect the attack easily. Each bus usually has a
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Table 5.3: The Strategy of FDI Attack in Distributed OPF Algorithm
Normal Operation FDI Attacks
1. Bus i minimizes the equation
(4.11) to update the local vari-
ables and sends the updated vari-
able Qi(k + 1) to backward bus
i − 1. Meanwhile, it will receive
the updated local variables from
neighbouring bus j.
1. The updated reactive power
variable Qi(k + 1) will be manip-
ulated to be a false data: Q
f
i (k +
1) = Qi(k + 1) + δerr. Then the
false data Q
f
i (k + 1) will be sen-
t to bus i − 1. In addition, bus
i will receive the malicious data
Q
f
j (k + 1) from bus j.
2. After receiving the informa-
tion from neighbour bus j, bus
i update the global reactive pow-
er variable Qi(k + 1) by equation
(4.12) and then sent the updat-
ed Qi(k + 1) to bus j. Subse-
quently, the Lagrange multipliers
yi(k+1), y
+
i (k+1) will be updated
by rules (4.13).
2. When the malicious data is
received, the controller will uti-
lize the false data Q
f
i (k + 1) to
update the global reactive power
Qfi (k + 1) by equation (4.12) and
send it to forward bus j. At the
same time, the Lagrange multipli-
er yi(k + 1) will be obtained by
utilizing the modified global reac-
tive power Qfi−1(k) which is from
the bus i− 1.
3. According to the received up-
dated global reactive power vari-
ables, bus i then will repeat the
same steps for k + 1th iteration
to obtain the new local variables
by (4.11).
3. Bus i will update the new local
variables based on the updated
incorrect data Qfi−1(k + 1) send-
ing from backward bus i − 1. It
is clearly that the entire iterative
process of node i will always be in
the wrong calculation and affect
the calculation of next iteration.
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relative small amount of change in an iterative process compared to the previous
iterative process.
5.3 Detection of Cyber-attack Model in Smart
Grid
According to the above analysis, both TD attack and FDI attack could affect the
final results of power loss. Without any countermeasures, the power system will be
put into contingency condition or even worse. Therefore, any further modification
of network or emergency condition could cause poor optimization results or even
cascading failure. It is crucially important to have appropriate countermeasures to
protect the system in advance or identify potential false data injection by observing
the power system. Generic protection measures rely mainly on establishing a se-
cured communication, protecting critical information and alleviating vulnerabilities
against all possible cyber attacks. The bad data injection detection widely studied
for centralized state estimation attack which is based on the entire system topology
and dynamics to achieve estimation of the state variables at control center [78, 79].
However, the countermeasures for centralized CP attacks are not suitable for a de-
centralized cyber attack model in this chapter. The information exchange in this
chapter only happens between neighbouring nodes and the state estimation function
can not be applied. In this section, two kinds of countermeasures under local neigh-
bouring nodes’ information exchange are proposed to detect the TD attack and FDI
attack, respectively.
5.3.1 Detection of TD attack
In this section, an effective defence mechanism scheme for the detection of TD
attack is presented, which can be divided into three steps: protection, detection and
mitigation. The details of generic defence strategy can be found as follows.
1. Deployment of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs): This is the pro-
tection stage to help against the cyber attacks in advance. A number of specific
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protections can be utilized to reduce or even erase some certain cyber attacks.
The deployment of secured or encrypted advanced measurement units, such as
known-secure PMUs [129], is one of the secure ways to protect the optimiza-
tion system from so as to be immune to the cyber attacks. Secured wireless
network has provided trustworthy communication for the PMU and advanced
metering infrastructure system. The known-secure PMUs can directly measure
the variables of bus to verify the value of neighbouring nodes independently.
However, the PMUs are too expensive to install them at all buses to protect
the information in the network. The requirement of PMUs installation at all
buses may not be able to implement, and it may be relaxed by installing at a
few important buses, such as the DG buses in Fig. 3.9. The identification of
important locations is left to be handled with in a future work.
2. Real-Time Detecting Method: Despite the effort of protection, the ad-
versary may still have the ability to attack protected component by utilizing
the vulnerability of the communication link. In case of this, a simple effec-
tive method is proposed to address a TD attack. Although the attacker can
modify the time stamping of the packet, the encrypted information usually
increases the challenge to decrypt the packet and increase the normal time of
a complete communication process. This method uses a time-delay estimation
(TDE) scheme, which contains a time-delay estimator and optimal controller,
to alert the received bus for a TD attack if a long time delay communication
is detected. In the meantime, the estimator has a buffer to store the history of
controller commands and transmission time for each message which could help
to estimate the time-delay in the communication channel for current informa-
tion exchange. If the delay time is always over an acceptable time delay for
three iterations (not too large comparing with normal communication time),
it will send alarm signal to the bus controller and system operator. We set τn
as the normal communication time and τa as the acceptable maximum time. If
delay time is larger than τa and less than
5
4
τa, the estimator give three chances
to return to normal communication time. If the delay time is larger than
5
4
τa, the estimator will report to system operator directly. Then the controller
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will stop receiving the information from neighbouring nodes until the warn-
ing signal is released. Furthermore, the time-delay estimator will active the
optimal controller to stabilize the iterative process. Moreover, the proposed
time-delay estimator can also examine time stamping of the transmission mes-
sage to determine if the control command has been maliciously modified or
not.
3. Mitigation of the cyber-attack: When the attack is confirmed, it is neces-
sary to mitigate the effects by the system operator to minimize the potential
disruptions and damages. If the TD attack has been cleared from the com-
munication system immediately, the restoration mechanisms can effectively
resume the information exchange during the optimization process. However,
if the TD attack has not been resolved in time, the bus operator needs to
consider other appropriate countermeasures to prevent the malicious attack
in the system. In this scenario, an optimal controller is proposed during the
attack. When time-delay signal is received by the time-delay estimator during
the information exchange process, the optimal controller can utilize the stored
historical information received in the past to forecast a new value instead of
the current manipulated message. The predictive value not only can stabilize
the iterative process, but also accelerate the convergence rate to obtain a fast
optimization result.
5.3.2 Detection of FDI attack
Different from the reduction of optimization speed during the TD attack, the FDI
attack may change the entire power flow calculation and make the optimization
results unstable or even lead to failure. In this section, an adaptive neighbouring
monitoring strategy is proposed to detect and prevent false data injection. This
strategy is inspired by the watchdog design in the security protocol for wireless Ad-
Hoc networks [130]. It helps the iterative algorithm find a reliable way of detecting
misbehavior information exchange and attempts to reduce the harm caused by FDI
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attack.
The proposed neighbouring monitoring strategy adds a reputation system against
the misbehavior information exchange and takes advantage of the neighbouring local
information to find out the dishonest nodes. Fig. 5.2 illustrates the framework
of the proposed strategy box which contains three components: Monitoring Unit,
Verification Unit and Protection Unit.
Figure 5.2: The diagram of the proposed neighbouring monitoring strategy.
Monitoring Unit
The monitoring unit holds the responsibility of receiving and monitoring the ex-
change information from neighbouring nodes. The time-delay estimator is also lo-
cated in the monitoring unit. First of all, this unit will check the time stamping and
estimate the communication time to detect the time-delay attack model. Second,
this unit will receive all information from other nodes and use all saved historical
data to predict the value of current received variables. The predictive value is based
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on the autoregressive (AR) model and a weighted coefficient is added to reduce the
impact of predictive error. The detailed AR model can be found in subsection 4.4.3.
The predictive value can be obtain by expression (4.32) in terms of the historical
data. Then it will send the predictive value together with the received message to
verification unit to detect if the received message is false data or not.
Verification Unit
The verification unit holds the responsibility of verifying the authenticity of the
message. When a false information injection is confirmed, the control command
will be transferred to activate the protection unit and a warning signal will be sent
to the DG node to notify that a misbehavior of neighbouring node is detected. In
wireless ad hoc networks, a detection and prevention of cyber attack is important.
In order to surmount this issue, the verification unit will utilize a reputation rating
mechanism to analyze the authenticity of the message.
Protection Unit
The protection unit holds the responsibility of utilizing the modified control instruc-
tion to mitigate the potential disruption or damage. When the protection unit is
activated by the verification unit, it will utilize the forecast value to continue the
iteration process instead of the manipulated variable by the attacker. The predictive
value can effectively reduce the impact of the cyber attack on the iterative algorith-
m. Then the protection unit will terminate the false information communication
and report the FDI attack to the system operator. After the FDI attack is released,
the protection unit will be closed and wait to be activated again.
Notation for Mechanism I
• Ω is the total number of iterations.
• Qi(k + 1) is the normal received value from neighbouring bus.
• Qerri (k + 1) is the predictive value for current receiving message by the evalu-
ation function.
• Repi(k + 1) is the reputation index of node i for k + 1th iteration.
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• reci(k) is the reputation count of node i for kth iteration.
• εi(k) is the proper deviation threshold value of node i at kth iteration which
is less than 1.
• ε′i is the extra deviation threshold value of node i at kth iteration due to the
error caused by the forecast.
• erri(k) is the error function estimating by the current received value and fore-
cast value.
• Reprefi (k) is the reference reputation for each node i at kth iteration.
The reputation rating mechanism means that each bus will have its own local repu-
tation value generated after each iteration. If the reputation value of node i belongs
to the reference reputation index, then the exchange information will be considered
as a trustworthy message. Otherwise, the exchange information will be treated as a
false message. The details of the neighbouring monitoring strategy is presented in
Table 5.4.
We initialize local deviation error index from the historical data. Then in order
to identify whether the information from neighbouring node has been manipulated,
the message of FDI attack from neighbouring nodes will be detected by calculating
the deviation between the current data and forecast data. The reputation rating
mechanism was introduced in step 3 which is based on the reputation index. When
the reputation value Repi(k) is smaller than the defined threshold value Rep
ref
i (k)
(we set as k − 1), the system will determine the current information as a false
information. The effective deviation error is updated based on the analysis of a set
of historical data that a machine learning technique can utilize the historical data
to update the proper range. However, part of the information exchange between
neighbouring nodes may have various misbehavior results due to different reasons
like transient link failure, larger prediction error by the predictor etc. The proposed
trust range mechanism in Fig. 5.3 is utilized to give these buses a fair chance. As
can be seen from step 3 and Fig. 5.3, if the deviation error is in the proper range, the
reputation count reci(k) will be set as 1; if the deviation error is in the trust range,
the reputation count reci(k) will be set as
2
3
which means that the proposed trust
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Table 5.4: Mechanism I: Reputation Rating Mechanism
Initialize: Each node i updates its own deviation error index through
the saved historical local data
Start each iteration k: where k ∈ Ω,
1. Each bus i communicates the updated variable Qi(k + 1) to the
backward neighbouring bus.
2. After receiving the message from neighbouring bus, the neighbour-
ing monitoring box of bus i will monitor and verify the authentic-
ity of the information by estimating the message Q
err
i (k + 1) from
neighbouring bus i− 1 using the evaluation function (4.32).
3. Then the verification unit will calculate the deviation error to check
the reputation value Repi(k) of bus i as follows:
Repi(k) =
k∑
k=1
reci(k)
k
.
(5.1)
where reci(k) can be written as
reci(k) =

1, if erri(k) ≤ |εi(k)|
2
3
, if |εi(k)| < erri(k) ≤ |ε′i(k)|
0, if erri(k) > |ε′i(k)|
(5.2)
where erri(k) = |Qerri (k)−Qi(k)|.
4. The introduced reputation value is controlled by the proper devia-
tion threshold εi(k) and extra deviation threshold ε
′
i(k). When the
calculated error is in different set ranges, the value of reputation
count will be marked as 1 in the proper range, 2
3
in the trust range,
or 0 out of the trust range.
5. If Repi(k) is less than the defined threshold value Rep
ref
i (k), the
verification unit will send the alarm signal to the receiving node
and activate the protection unit to modify the control instruction
instead of using the false information at the same time. Otherwise,
the verification unit will inform the receiving node to continue using
the received information from neighbouring nodes to perform the
iterative algorithm.
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6. When the protection unit is activated, the iteration variable will be
replaced by the predicted value to continue the iterative calculation
until the attack warning is released by the system operator.
7. If the attack warning is released, the protection unit will be closed
and the current reputation value will also be reset to current refer-
ence reputation value Reprefi (k).
8. Repeat k=k+1 until satisfied the defined minimum error.
range mechanism gives the misbehavior nodes three opportunities to compensate
for the large deviation due to the predicted error; if the deviation error is out of
the trust range, the reputation count reci(k) will be set as 0. Note that each bus
may have a different reference deviation threshold value εi(k) and extra deviation
threshold ε
′
i(k) due to the different stages of iterations. After a certain period
of iterative process, the reputation count of misbehavior will be improved by the
verification unit automatically to remove from the misbehavior list if the reputation
value Repi(k) is still larger than the defined threshold value Rep
ref
i (k). Then the
algorithm will have an additional three chances in case of new large deviation errors.
Next, when the information is confirmed as a false information, the protection unit
will use the predicted value instead of the false information and notify the system
operator. The predicted value will always be adopted until the cyber-attack is
released by the system operator. It is crucial for system operator to know that the
predicted value can mitigate the efforts of attacks immediately on the procedure of
iteration when the cyber-attack is detected.
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Figure 5.3: The operating condition of proper deviation range.
5.4 Case Study Results
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of proposed OPF algorithm against
the cyber-attack. The 33-bus system with DGs in Fig. 3.9 will be applied and it is
based on the configuration of the Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and
Management (FREEDM) system [131]. The FREEDM system is a prototype of the
smart grid, and there is an open-standard-based operating system called Distributed
Grid Intelligence (DGI). The DGI is installed across all of the buses and can utilize
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the communication network to exchange information with neighbouring nodes. The
Matpower/Matlab is utilized to simulate the performance of the algorithm in power
system.
5.4.1 Results with TD Cyber-attack
Fig. 5.4 shows the normal iterative reactive power injection of one node compared
with the predicted reactive power injection. It is demonstrated that the predicted
value is very close to the normal iterative value to protect the packet loss or time-
delay. In the early stages from 2 to 12 iterations, the predictive deviation is large
which can be seen in the enlarged picture of Fig. 5.4. Then in the later iterations,
the deviation between the predicted value and real value almost can be negligible.
For brevity, we only present the comparison result for one special node 18, but the
experimental results are also applicable to all other nodes. All the predicted values
are close to the real values. Therefore, the proposed predicted parameter is very
valuable to practical real-time optimal power flow calculation in such a smart grid.
Figure 5.4: The comparison between the predicted value and real value for one node.
As for the TD cyber-attack case, the simulation result of partial nodes in TD attack
case (nodes 2, 12, 15, 18, 23, 25, 27 and 33) can be found in Fig. 5.5. Assume
that a TD attack only occurs in the first 100 ms. Without any defence counter-
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measures, when the TD cyber-attack happens, the simulation result presents that
the convergence result has a large fluctuation in the early stage of iterations (42.3%
variation). Although the convergence results do not fluctuate greatly in the later
stage of iterations, the final experimental result still has a certain deviation error
compared with the normal optimal result. Although the TD attack will not result
in non-convergence of the optimal result, it reduces the convergence rate of the algo-
rithm and needs more time to achieve the same convergence goal of the system power
loss. If the TD attack can be detected, the predictive value can be used to replace
the original modified message and mitigate the effects of TD attack and increase the
convergence speed to minimize the potential disruptions. On the contrary, the result
of weighted AR-based TD attack in Fig. 5.5 demonstrates the improvements of the
iterative results when the proposed predictive value is used during the TD cyber-
attack. The result presents that the iterative result can be improved dramatically
and is close to the result in normal case without delay. Although the experimental
result also has a certain fluctuation due to the prediction error, the fluctuation can
be negligible compared with the fluctuation in the TD cyber-attack case. It can
be anticipated that the proposed predictive value strategy is valuable in a practical
iterative algorithm to mitigate the effects of the network TD cyber-attack.
Figure 5.5: The comparison of iterative results among normal case, TD attack case
and AR-based TD attack case.
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5.4.2 Results with FDI Cyber-attack
The above simulation results are based on the TD cyber-attack. In this section,
the results under FDI cyber attack model will be discussed. This simulation result
considers the time-delay and will apply the weighted AR iterative algorithm during
the iterative process as described in subsection 4.4.4. Compared with the TD cyber
attack case, the FDI cyber attack case can send any control instruction to neigh-
bouring node during the iterative process. If it could happen, the iterative results
will not be able to converge completely. Fig. 5.6 shows the result under FDI cyber-
attack between 100 to 120 iterations in a random attack scenario. When the attack
happens without any defence countermeasures, the simulation result will be unable
to converge completely. Fig. 5.6(a) shows that the result has a large fluctuation
between 100-120 iterations, where the fluctuation range can even reach 8000. In the
first 100 iterations, the experimental result can converge appropriately to 0.125 p.u.
as shown in Fig. 5.6(b). When the FDI cyber-attack occurs without any defence
countermeasures, the result shows a significant fluctuation during the attack in Fig.
5.6(c). If the result during the FDI attack is adopted, it will decrease the economic
benefits and induce further and more intensive damages into the physical system.
As can be seen from Fig. 5.6(d), although the attack is released after 120 iterations,
the experimental result after 80 iterations still has a larger deviation error compared
with the global optimal result.
When the proposed weighted AR-based neighbouring monitoring strategy is applied
into the iterative algorithm, each node can check the authenticity of the received
message by using the reputation rating mechanism. If the fake information is con-
firmed, the forecasting value will be used to execute the iterative algorithm. Fig. 5.7
presents the experimental result with the proposed AR-based neighbouring moni-
toring strategy after 100 iterations. It can be anticipated that the large fluctuation
between 100 and 120 iteration has been improved dramatically compared with the
results in Fig. 5.6(c). The results with weighted AR-based neighbouring monitoring
strategy are very close to the iterative results of no-attack case, which means the
proposed strategy shows a good performance in mitigating the impact by the FDI
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cyber attack.
Figure 5.6: The iterative result under FDI cyber-attack between 100 to 120 iterations
without any defence countermeasures. (a) is the entire results. (b), (c) and (d) are
three separate parts of (a).
Figure 5.7: The comparison of iterative results between normal with no-attack case
and AR-based neighbouring monitoring strategy with FDI attack case.
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Figure 5.8: The comparison of iterative results between FDI case without attack
and FDI case with AR-based neighbouring monitoring strategy after 120 iterations.
Comparing with the results in FDI cyber-attack case without defence, the perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme after 120 iterations is shown in Fig. 5.8. Although
the results in FDI case without defence are still convergent after 120 iteration, the
final convergence result in 200 iteration has a large deviation error from the glob-
al optimal value, which is four times larger than the normal optimal result. As
demonstrated in the Fig. 5.8, it can be anticipated that the proposed neighbour-
ing monitoring strategy is able to mitigate the effect of the cyber-attack in OPF
algorithm and obtain an improved convergence result.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed two potential cyber-attacks in distributed OPF
algorithm. First, two cyber-attack models, time-delay attack model and false data
injection attack model, are discussed during the OPF iterative procedure. Both two
attacks can result in an increased power loss and the FDI attack can even lead to
instability of the convergence result. Then two different detections are proposed
to defend the TD attack and FDI attack. As for TD attack, the defence mecha-
nism scheme, including protection, detection and mitigation, is proposed to detect
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the possible attack and mitigate the effect of the TD attack; as for FDI attack,
an weighted AR-based neighbouring monitoring detection strategy with reputation
mechanism is proposed to identify the misbehaving local information exchange to
neighbouring nodes. The proposed strategy identifies the FDI attack by comparing
the current received variables with the predicted value. The deviation error area
can be set by relying on a set of historical data.
The simulation results have presented that the two proposed defance scheme is effi-
cient can achieve improved convergence results during the cyber attacks. The time
delay attack can only slow down the convergence speed, but the FDI delay attack
may lead to a very large fluctuation in the convergence result. If the cyber attack
is confirmed, system operators can use the predicted value to replace the manipu-
lated information. By contrast, the simulation results indicate that the proposed
mechanism can reduce the fluctuation of the results dramatically during 100 and
120 iterations and improve the final convergence results significantly. Future work
will focus on considering other malicious scenarios, for example, neighbouring nodes
collude with each other under multiple false data injection attack model.
Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, we briefly summarize the performance evaluation of decentralized
voltage control strategy combined with stochastic communication time-delay as well
as the improved ADMM-based optimization algorithm in decentralized OPF model.
In addition, the cyber-physical analysis is simulated to evaluate the performance of
the efficiency on defensive strategy. In this concluding chapter, a brief summary
of the key contributions from different chapters will be given in Section 6.1. Some
limitations of work are discussed in Section 6.2. Several future directions of the
research issues from current power system challenges are presented in Section 6.3.
6.1 General Conclusion of Different Chapters
Due to the increasing penetration of DGs, the reactive power allocation of DG
is emerging to control system voltage level. In chapter 3, a decentralized voltage
control method combined with time-delay model is proposed to analyze the perfor-
mance of the control strategy. Compared with the independent control method, the
coordinated control method can both effectively regulate the voltage level of each
bus and improve the power factor of each node to enlarge the total reactive power
capability. The maximum reactive power output could decrease from 0.45 p.u. to
0.34 p.u. which could drastically reduce the possibility of active power curtailment
occurrence even if the total network loads have a higher demand than usual. This
control strategy can effectively increase the range of voltage fluctuations that can
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be controlled. Despite the limitation of communication technology, the simulation
results have shown that small time-delay still can affect the performance of decen-
tralized voltage control method in real-time. Although the upcoming 5G can be an
improved technology with less communication transmission delays, the impact on
the decentralized control system with information exchange cannot be ignored. In
the case of packet losses, such control strategy cannot even work properly without
any control instructions. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the impact of delay
and propose an effective method to resolve this issue.
Chapter 4 presents a decentralized optimization algorithm, called ADMM algorith-
m, to minimize system power loss. One of the key advantages of the ADMM is that
a fully centralized objective can be solved in a decentralized way that each local
function can be handled by its own local parameters and processor. It can rewrite
the objective function with local objectives by local variables. Each of these local ob-
jective function contains a selected variables of the global variables. In addition, the
stochastic communication delay model is applied into the ADMM algorithm which
can simulate the performance on the algorithm with time-delay consideration. In
this chapter, both synchronous and asynchronous distributed ADMM algorithms are
proposed to assess the convergence rate of the algorithm. In order to mitigate the
impact of the time-delay, we assess four different strategies, skipping strategy (SS),
previous value strategy (PVS), autoregressive (AR) strategy (ARS) and weighted
AR strategy (WARS). The performance of WARS has been investigated and verified
by simulation results. It has been demonstrated that the proposed WARS in both
synchronous and asynchronous algorithm can achieve a better convergence results
compared with other strategies when the stochastic time-delay occurs. If the prob-
abilities of time-delay increase or communication devices of nodes are out of work,
the convergence results will have great fluctuations. Therefore, the proposed ADM-
M algorithm is meaningful for decentralized algorithm in distributed power system
with large penetration of DGs.
In order to analyze the effect of CP attack and reduce the threat from adversary,
two attack models, time delay attack and false data injection attack, based on local
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information exchange are discussed in detail. Both attack models demonstrate how
the malicious cyber attacks actually progress during the communication. In order to
detect the attacks and reduce the impact of objective function, two countermeasures
are proposed to detect the TD attack and FDI attack, respectively. For TD attack, a
defence mechanism based on three steps is presented to protect, detect and mitigate
the TD attack. For FDI attack, an AR-based neighbouring monitoring scheme is
proposed to monitor and verify the information from other nodes. A predicted
value is used to calculate the deviation error from the reputation index. Trust
range mechanism is proposed in case of a major estimation error. According to the
simulation results, when CP attack models are applied in the algorithm, simulation
results demonstrate that attack can reduce the convergence rate or even fail to
converge. However, the proposed countermeasures can improve the results strikingly.
Moreover, the results with proposed AR-based NMS can be better than the results
without attack.
6.1.1 Limitation of Work
In the reactive power control strategy to the voltage control problem, it should be
noted that the coordinated control method only deals with the case of partial nodes.
The application of whole nodes was not discussed in chapter 3. Meanwhile, the
control strategy improved the power factor to maximize the capability of reactive
power output but did not consider the optimization of reactive power allocation.
Under the time-delay case, the reactive power control strategy did not perform well
to mitigate the impact of time-delay. It is necessary to propose an appropriate
way to reduce the possibility of a sudden voltage increase or decrease in voltage
level. To further exploit the impact of time-delay, the combination of independent
strategy and coordinated control strategy can be used as an effective way to mitigate
the sudden fluctuation of voltage level. In addition, the time-delay model based
on 3G technology is not perfect for delay analysis. The more specific delay time,
such as decision-making delay, should be considered for power system optimization.
The decision-making time-delay will become dominant while the new 5G technology
can reduce the communication time-delay dramatically in the future smart grid
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communication.
In our existing work on the OPF problem, the adopted ADMM-based decentralized
OPF algorithm can reduce the impact of time-delay on the convergence performance.
The objective function is based on the improved linear quadratic function. However,
in practice, it has certain limitations in the real power system. Besides, the stochastic
time-delay model also needs to be updated for new communication technologies.
The proposed AR model also contained certain predictive error, a new predictive
model can be proposed to apply into the decentralized OPF problem. Due to time
constraint and lengthy workload, we cannot undertake this in this chapter. The
author will conduct an in-depth analysis in the next article.
Our work in chapter 5 has only introduced a general scheme to analyze the impact of
CP attack on the convergence performance. The colluding attack is not considered
during the attack. If the colluding attack happens, the proposed neighbouring mon-
itoring strategy may fail to detect the attack due to the information change between
nodes at the same time. The proposed neighbouring monitoring strategy is just the
first step to analyze the cyber attack in the decentralized issue for power system. It
should be noted that cyber attackers can take advantage of all vulnerabilities and
contingencies in the network to damage the power system. The causes, processes
and consequences across both cyber and physical spaces shall be comprehensively
analyzed with consideration of all potential interdependence threats.
6.2 Future Directions of the Research
This thesis is the first in demonstrating decentralized control strategies combined
with information and communication technology in the distribution power system
network. There are a number of research gaps which have not been dealt with in
this thesis. Some of them should be considered in a future work as listed below:
In chapter 3, the optimization problem should be considered to solve the voltage
fluctuation issue cooperatively. In addition, the combination of independent and
cooperative control strategies should be studied to avoid sudden fluctuation of volt-
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age levels in an emergency. Another interesting direction of our work is to employ
new communication technology to obtain the total processing time of delay and the
probability of a delay in the framework of a distributed smart grid network.
In chapter 4, the framework of linear objective function can be transfer to a complex
optimization problem, such as the non-linear problem. A relevant analysis of a
non-linear problem could be an interesting research direction in a practical power
system model. The multi-objective research can also be a meaningful area, e.g.,
minimization of power loss, maximization of economic benefit and the reactive power
objective.
In chapter 5, in order to analyze all possible attack models, it is necessary to research
all attack models including the practical attacks which may not be the worst cases.
However, these cases can cause a chain reaction that may lead the system to a
critical operation or a large blackout. To mitigate the potential threats in different
scenarios, it is interesting to develop an effective defence scheme to deal with various
threats.
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Appendix A
Basic and Auxiliary Results
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1(a): According to the update of global variables (4.35), we can
obtain that the following is true
∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1)) + yi(k) + ρi(xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1)) = 0, (4.36)
Further, from (4.36), we have
∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1)) = −yi(k + 1), (4.37)
Similarly, it also have the following equality for iteration k
∇Fi(xi(kτi )) = −yi(k), (4.38)
Therefore, when the new information is delayed or lost for each node i, it follows
that
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∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1)) = ∇Fi(xi(kτi )), (4.39)
According to (4.39), we have
‖ yi(k + 1)− yi(k) ‖22= 0, (4.40)
It means that Lemma 1(a) is true when message delayed or loss occurred. If the
information arrives, we also have the following results by using triangle inequality.
‖ yi(k + 1)− yi(k) ‖22 =‖ ∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1))−∇Fi(xi(kτi )) ‖22
≤ K2i ‖ xi(kτi + 1)− xi(kτi ) ‖
≤ K2i (
Ti∑
κ=0
‖ xi(k + 1− κ)− xi(k − κ) ‖)2
≤ K2i (Ti + 1)
Ti∑
κ=0
‖ xi(k + 1− κ)− xi(k − κ) ‖22 .
(4.41)
Subsequently, the desired result in Lemma 1(a) is achieved.
Proof of Lemma 1(b): According to the Lipschitz continuity of ∇Fi and triangle
inequality, which implies that
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Fi(xi(k + 1)) ≤ Fi(xi(k + 1)) +∇Fi(xi(k + 1)) ‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖
+
Ki
2
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22
= Fi(xi(k + 1))− ‖ ∇Fi(xi(k + 1))−∇Fi(xi(k + 1)) ‖‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖
+∇Fi(xi(k + 1)) ‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖ +Ki
2
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22
≤ Fi(xi(k + 1)) +∇Fi(xi(k + 1)) ‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖
+
3Ki
2
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22 .
(4.42)
Further, from (4.37), we have
L({xi(k)}; {xi(k)}, {yi(k)}) =
ν∑
i=1
(Fi(xi(k + 1)) + yi(k + 1) ‖ xi(k + 1)
− xi(k + 1) ‖ +ρi
2
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22)
≥
ν∑
i=1
(Fi(xi(k + 1)) +
ρi − 3Ki
2
‖ xi(k + 1)
− xi(k + 1) ‖22 + ‖ ∇Fi(xi(k + 1))
−∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1)) ‖‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖).
(4.43)
According to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the last term in (4.43), it follows
that
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L({xi(k + 1)}; {xi(k + 1)}, {yi(k + 1)})
≥ Plos + ρi − 3Ki
2
∑
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22
− ‖ ∇Fi(xi(k + 1))−∇Fi(xi(kτi + 1)) ‖‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖
≥ Plos + ρi − 4Ki
2
∑
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k + 1) ‖22 −
Ki
2
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(kτi + 1) ‖22
≥ Plos −
ν∑
i=1
Ki
2
diam2(X ) > −∞.
(4.44)
where the last inequality follows the fact that X is compact in assumption 1 and
ρi − 7Ki > 0 in assumption 3
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1(a): According to Lemma 1, it is true that L({xi(k)}; {xi(k)}, {yi(k)})
converges as k →∞. Therefore, it holds from Lemma 1(a) that
lim
k→∞
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k) ‖→ 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.45a)
lim
k→∞
‖ xi(k + 1)− xi(k) ‖→ 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.45b)
Then, using (4.45) into (4.41), it follows that
lim
k→∞
‖ yi(k + 1)− yi(k) ‖→ 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.46a)
lim
k→∞
‖ xi(k)− xi(k) ‖→ 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.46b)
Proof of Theorem 1(b): According to (4.46), it is true that certain sequences
{{x∗i }, {x∗i }, {y∗i }} exist which follows that
∇Fi(x∗i ) + y∗i = 0, i = 1, ..., ν (4.47a)
x∗i = x
∗
i , i = 1, ..., ν (4.47b)
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Since xi(k + 1) ∈ X , it holds that x∗i ∈ X . Once we can present that the primal
feasibility gap goes to zero, the proof for stationary solution is straightforward. The
details also can be found in [132]. Then the desired result is achieved..
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